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Abstract
This article proposes a legal framework to analyze the "high crime area" concept in Fourth Amendment
reasonable suspicion challenges. Under existing Supreme Court precedent, reviewing courts are allowed to
consider that an area is a "high crime area" as a factor to evaluate the reasonableness of a Fourth Amendment
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determines that an area is, in fact, a higher crime area. Yet, after Wardlow, the concept has taken on controlling
significance in determining the constitutional protections of citizens located in certain neighborhoods.
Because new crime-mapping technology exists to generate objective and verifiable data on crime rates in
particular areas, this article proposes requiring the government to introduce this information in Fourth
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individual liberty is protected in all jurisdictions.
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Picture the following:  On two separate street corners, in two 
different neighborhoods, two men stand holding two identical paper 
bags.  Police officers patrolling each neighborhood looking for drug 
dealers spot the men, and in response to police presence, each man 
flees.  One man runs through a poverty-stricken neighborhood 
known for having the highest incidence of drug crime and murder in 
the city.  The other man runs through an affluent neighborhood that 
has not had any recorded drug arrests or murders in over a year.  
Under existing Supreme Court precedent, the police officers may be 
legally entitled to stop the first man, but not the second.  The Fourth 
Amendment protections of each man are different simply because of 
the neighborhood in which the police observation occurs.  The fact 
that the suspicious action and unprovoked flight occurs in a “high-
crime area” alters the Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion 
analysis. 
But, what if the area in which the first man fled did not have the 
highest incidence of drug crime or murder in a given jurisdiction?  
What if it was merely one of the many areas that suffered from 
moderate levels of criminal activity in a city?  What if the area had 
undergone recent economic improvement and development, 
reducing the amount of crime in a historically crime-ridden 
neighborhood?  Would it still be considered a high-crime area?  What 
if the area in question is known for a high incidence of car theft and 
burglary, but not drugs or violent crime—should that affect the 
police officer’s suspicions?  What if the police officer thinks the area 
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is a high-crime area, but in fact it turns out to be a rather low-crime 
area compared to other areas?  How should this affect the Fourth 
Amendment calculus to determine reasonable suspicion?  These are 
the questions addressed in this Article. 
“High-crime areas”1 are a fact of constitutional law:  individuals in 
those areas have different Fourth Amendment protections than they 
would in other locations in the same town, city, or state.2  This 
development represents a significant shift away from equal 
constitutional protections for all citizens.  In the context of Fourth 
Amendment police-citizen “stops,” high-crime areas are 
constitutional realities3 that must be dealt with by any lawyer seeking 
to protect Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches 
and seizures.4   
In a series of Fourth Amendment cases from Adams v. Williams5 to 
Illinois v. Wardlow,6 the Supreme Court of the United States has 
considered the character of the neighborhood7 to be one factor in 
finding “reasonable suspicion”8 to stop someone.  While never yet 
allowing the character of the neighborhood to be the sole 
justification for a stop based on reasonable suspicion, it has narrowed 
the totality of circumstances needed to two factors:  “high-crime area” 
and unprovoked flight from police.9  Lower courts have gone further 
 1. The term “high-crime area” was first used by the Supreme Court in Adams v. 
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147–48 (1972) (“While properly investigating the activity of a 
person who was reported to be carrying narcotics and a concealed weapon and who 
was sitting alone in a car in a high-crime area at 2:15 in the morning, Sgt. Connolly 
had ample reason to fear for his safety.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (recognizing that the 
Court allows the fact that a stop occurs in a “high-crime area” to be taken into 
consideration in performing a Terry analysis). 
 3. See infra Part I (tracing the use of the phrase “high-crime area” in Supreme 
Court opinions). 
 4. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
 5. 407 U.S. 143 (1972). 
 6. 528 U.S. 119 (2000).  In Illinois v. Wardlow, the Court found that “officers are 
not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining 
whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further 
investigation.”  Id. at 124. 
 7. Id. at 129. 
 8. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968) (establishing the reasonable 
suspicion test). 
 9. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (“In this case, moreover, it was not merely 
respondent’s presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking that aroused the 
officers’ suspicion, but his unprovoked flight upon noticing the police.  Our cases 
have also recognized that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in 
determining reasonable suspicion.”). 
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and allowed a high-crime area combined with additional otherwise 
innocent actions to constitute sufficient reasonable suspicion for a 
stop.10  The term “high-crime area” has become a familiar “talismanic 
litany”11 often quoted and almost always determinative in legitimating 
the police conduct of stopping an individual.  The conclusion in legal 
opinions, among scholars, and on the street is the same:  a high-crime 
area designation almost always shifts the analytical balance toward a 
finding of reasonable suspicion. 
What exactly is a “high-crime area”?  The Supreme Court has never 
provided a definition.  Lower court decisions are equally imprecise.  
Yet, as practicing criminal defense lawyers know, the question is 
highlighted in almost every Fourth Amendment suppression hearing 
focused on the legitimacy of a police stop.12  A police officer takes the 
stand, explains his actions, testifies to his suspicions, adds the magic 
words—“high-crime area”13—and reasonable suspicion is found as a 
 10. See, e.g., United States v. Baskin, 401 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding 
reasonable suspicion to stop person who tried to evade police near a 
methamphetamine lab); United States v. Vargas, 369 F.3d 98, 101 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(finding reasonable suspicion to stop person because of his flight in a high-crime 
area coupled with information from reliable source); Bolton v. Taylor, 367 F.3d 5, 9 
(1st Cir. 2004) (finding reasonable suspicion to stop driver in known area of 
prostitution because suspect quickly pulled out of parking lot upon seeing officer); 
United States v. Jordan, 232 F.3d 447, 447–49 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding reasonable 
suspicion to detain person seen running in a high-crime area because of knowledge 
that nearby store had recently been robbed); United States v. Moore, 235 F.3d 700, 
703–04 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding reasonable suspicion to search individual running 
through an apartment building because apartment was in high-crime area and police 
had observed suspicious people and known drug user leaving building). 
 11. See Curtis v. United States, 349 A.2d 469, 472 (D.C. 1975) (“[W]e eschew the 
notion that the above facts assume added significance because they happen to have 
occurred in a high crime area.  This familiar talismanic litany, without a great deal 
more, cannot support an inference that appellant was engaged in criminal 
conduct.”); L. Darnell Weeden, It Is Not Right Under the Constitution To Stop and Frisk 
Minority People Because They Don’t Look Right, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 829, 839 
(1999) (“The courts have consistently considered the crime rate in a given 
neighborhood as a relevant factor in justifying a police officer’s increased 
suspiciousness of a suspect.”). 
 12. For a practicing criminal defense attorney, this reality is observed every day in 
suppression hearings.  Such suppression hearings involve application of the 
exclusionary rule and are many times the only mechanism to effectuate a client’s 
Fourth Amendment rights.  See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968) 
(“In order to effectuate the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of freedom from 
unreasonable searches and seizures, this Court long ago conferred upon defendants 
in federal prosecutions the right, upon motion and proof, to have excluded from 
trial evidence which had been secured by means of an unlawful search and seizure.  
More recently, this Court has held that the ‘exclusionary rule is an essential part of 
both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments . . . .’”) (citations omitted). 
 13. This phenomenon was recognized and criticized by a former prosecutor.  See 
Lenese C. Herbert, Can’t You See What I Am Saying?  Making Expressive Conduct a Crime 
in High Crime Areas, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 135, 135 (2002) (“As an eager 
young Assistant United States Attorney who ‘papered’ countless complaints, 
conducted numerous hearings, and tried a substantial number of cases, I learned 
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matter of constitutional law.  Rarely is there any analysis of why this 
particular area is a high-crime area, on what objective, verifiable, or 
empirical data the police officer has based his conclusion, or whether 
the officer knew this information before he made the stop.  In fact, 
trial courts rarely seem to question whether there is even an official 
definition of a high-crime area in their jurisdiction,14 on what facts 
that definition is based, whether the definition changes over time, 
and whether there are different types of offense-specific areas (i.e., 
those areas known as “high drug areas,” “high theft areas,” “high 
robbery areas,” etc.).  Statistical data is rarely entered on the record 
by the government.15  Outside experts are never consulted.16  The 
high-crime area designation is hardly ever empirically supported with 
factual evidentiary proof.  As a result, individuals’ Fourth 
Amendment constitutional protections are altered without verifiable 
“specific”17 and “objective”18 reasons to support that change. 
This Article does not seek to challenge the use of the “high-crime 
area” designation.  Although scholars have criticized the term as 
how to decode police officer jargon and law enforcement terminology.  One of the 
most commonly used—yet seldom defined—phrases was ‘high-crime area.’ . . . 
Before court appearances, I would often question police officers about this 
characterization.  In court, however, judges rarely challenged the proffered label or 
required its definition.  Judges never asked officers for data to support assertions that 
an area was high-crime.”). 
 14. But see United States v. Wright, 485 F.3d 45, 49 n.3 (1st Cir. 2007) (“None of 
the officers offered boundaries or a definition of the ‘area’ being described as a 
‘high crime area.’”); State v. Cooper, 830 So. 2d 440, 445 n.5 (La. Ct. App. 2002) 
(“One is tempted to imagine a ‘low-crime area.’  Does such exist?  Perhaps a few 
high-dollar gated communities with moats, barbed wire and armed guards?  Could it 
be that the term ‘high crime area’ is so over-used, and crime is so rampant, that a 
better definition of same today may be the entire State of Louisiana?  Or is it just 
where the poor folks live?  Is this fair?  Is it legal?”). 
 15. In criminal cases, as opposed to civil lawsuits, statistics are rarely, if ever, 
introduced.  The only criminal cases using such statistics are discussed in this Article.  
See infra Part II.  
 16. However, experts are consulted in civil cases involving liability of stores and 
other industries in high-crime areas.  See, e.g., Henry v. Parrish of Jefferson, 835 So. 
2d 912, 918 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (reviewing testimony introduced by plaintiff’s expert 
regarding “high-crime area” designation in negligence suit); Simpson v. Boyd, 880 
So. 2d 1047, 1052 (Miss. 2004) (assessing expert testimony as to whether building was 
situated in “high-crime area” as part of negligence suit).  There are no major 
reported cases involving an expert testifying in a criminal case about a high-crime 
area. 
 17. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (recognizing that the applicable test 
under the Fourth Amendment requires that the police officer making a detention 
“be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational 
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion”). 
 18. See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (paraphrasing 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1980)) (“In making reasonable-
suspicion determinations, reviewing courts must look at the ‘totality of the 
circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized 
and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.”). 
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being racially biased,19 class biased,20 targeted to affect communities of 
color,21 violative of First Amendment rights,22 and troubling 
constitutional law, it is currently a reality of Fourth Amendment law.23  
 19. See Amy Ronner, Fleeing While Black, the Fourth Amendment Apartheid, 32 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 383, 385 (2001) (“[T]he Wardlow Court effectively removed the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment from individuals that need it the most, 
namely minorities who have faced historic discrimination at the hands of the 
police.”); Mia Carpiniello, Note, Striking a Sincere Balance:  A Reasonable Black Person 
Standard for “Location Plus Evasion” Terry Stops, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 355, 358 (2001) 
(proposing a race-specific standard for reasonable suspicion:  “[A] race specific 
standard will force police officers and the Court to recognize the unique experience 
of racial minorities in the United States and the significance of race in Terry stops.”). 
 20. See Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 55 FLA. 
L. REV. 391, 405 (2003) (“[L]iving in a high crime (poor) neighborhood, while not 
sufficient in itself to give police reasonable suspicion to stop individuals, can 
authorize detention on relatively little else, such as when the person runs from the 
police, despite the fact that many poor people, especially African American ones in 
certain urban areas, do not want to deal with the police even when innocent of any 
crime.”); Brian D. Walsh, Note, Illinois v. Wardlow:  High Crime Areas, Flight, and the 
Fourth Amendment, 54 ARK. L. REV. 879, 913–14 (2002) (“Wardlow increases the burden 
on innocent residents of ‘high-crime’ areas.  Not only do those residents still have 
the problems associated with living in a ‘high-crime’ area, but Wardlow has now 
increased their risk of being detained by police.”). 
 21. See David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion:  When Black and Poor Means 
Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 677–78 (1994) (“It will not surprise anyone who 
lives or works in an urban center to learn that these areas share another 
characteristic in addition to the presence of crime:  they are racially segregated.  
African Americans and Hispanic Americans make up almost all of the population in 
most of the neighborhoods the police regard as high crime areas.”); Lewis R. Katz, 
Terry v. Ohio at Thirty Five:  A Revisionist’s View, 74 MISS. L.J. 423, 493–94 (2004) 
(“‘[H]igh crime area’ becomes a centerpiece of the Terry analysis, serving almost as a 
talismanic signal justifying investigative stops.  Location in America, in this context, is 
a proxy for race or ethnicity.  By sanctioning investigative stops on little more than 
the area in which the stop takes place, the phrase ‘high crime area’ has the effect of 
criminalizing race.  It is as though a black man standing on a street corner or sitting 
in a legally parked car has become the equivalent to ‘driving while black’ for 
motorists.”); David Seawell, Wardlow’s Case:  A Call To Broaden the Perspective of 
American Criminal Law, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 1119, 1131 (2001) (“Due to the politics of 
past and present racism, minority members are often forced to live in poverty-
stricken, crime-riddled communities, and this segregation continues despite race-
neutral policies.  Therefore, the high crime area designation as a basis for increased 
legal justification of police, and diminished expectations of privacy for residents, only 
perpetuate this distrust and the politics of identification.”). 
 22. See Herbert, supra note 13, at 158 (arguing that flight from police is a 
protected means of non-verbal communication protected by the First Amendment). 
 23. See, e.g., Stanley A. Goldman, To Flee or Not To Flee—That Is the Question:  Flight 
as Furtive Gesture, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 557, 572 (2001) (exploring how judges attempt to 
find a constitutionally acceptable definition of “high-crime area” without questioning 
the designation itself); Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the Street:  
Considering the Character of the Neighborhood in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 99, 120–22 (1999) (“The result is an extraordinary body of case law, in which 
strikingly similar behaviors in high crime areas lead to wildly different outcomes.  In 
a high crime area, sitting in a car in a parking lot late at night may create reasonable 
suspicion in Georgia, but not in Tennessee, and standing on a street corner may 
create reasonable suspicion in Louisiana, but not in Pennsylvania, even though these 
jurisdictions apply the same standard.”) (citations omitted). 
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This Article instead seeks to bring intellectual honesty and objective 
clarity to the existing constitutional framework. 
Because the “high-crime area” designation is a fact of constitutional 
jurisprudence, this Article suggests that courts must begin taking 
seriously the requirement that the term be based on objective, 
quantifiable—statistical or otherwise—settled data, rather than 
allowing the designation of “high-crime areas” to be based on 
subjective assertions or unprovable suspicions.  As will be discussed in 
detail, such objective evidence can be entered into the record 
through statistical data, expert testimony, or official police 
department reports.24  This evidence can then be subjected to cross-
examination and ruled on by the trial court.  Like other contested 
facts in the suppression hearing, only in this way will appellate courts 
and commentators be able to evaluate the usefulness of this legal 
terminology. 
The technology to generate the necessary objective data to 
characterize a neighborhood’s crime rate has now reached a 
sufficient maturity to be useful for litigants and courts.25  
Neighborhood mapping systems and computer crime pattern 
technology currently exists with a sophistication that was only 
developing when the Supreme Court announced its adoption of the 
“high-crime area” concept.26  For the first time, it is possible to 
compile the statistics and catalogue the number of arrests and crime 
patterns in a neighborhood or city.27  It is, thus, possible to determine 
if a specifically delineated geographical area is, in fact, “higher crime” 
than another area.  Many police districts use this information for 
 24. See infra Part III (discussing the sophistication and prevalence of crime 
mapping data). 
 25. See Luc Anselin et al., Spatial Analyses of Crime, in 4 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2000, 
MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 213 (David Duffee ed., 2000), 
available at  http://www.ncjrs.gov/criminal_justice2000/vol_4/04e.pdf (“Many of the 
capabilities to support computerized mapping and spatial statistical analysis emerged 
only recently during the 1990s.”). 
 26. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972) (referring to the term “high-
crime area” for the first time in a Supreme Court opinion). 
 27. See Anselin et al., supra note 25, at 215 (“Technological advances, primarily in 
computer capabilities, are fundamental to recent analytical advances in the methods 
available for analyzing place-based crime data.  The advent of computer mapping 
applications and accompanying geographic information systems (GIS) are crucial to 
being able to measure and represent the spatial relationships in data.  Perhaps the 
most powerful analytical tools emerging from GIS technologies are (1) flexible 
spatial aggregation capabilities to facilitate the measurement of place-based crime 
and (2) simple contiguity matrices for representing neighbor relationships between 
different areal units . . . . [C]omputer aided dispatch (CAD) systems of citizen calls to 
police make it possible to systematically quantify varying levels of criminal activity at 
different places within a city.”). 
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staffing and resource allocation,28 but rarely does it make its way to 
court.  This Article suggests that the data should be included in the 
Fourth Amendment analysis and refined in a way that offers clarity to 
police, judges, and those individuals who live in high-crime 
neighborhoods.29
Part I of this Article explores the use of the “high-crime area” 
designation in Fourth Amendment cases.  Tracing the term in 
Supreme Court opinions, it can be reasonably concluded that the 
designation has grown in importance—occasionally being the 
determinative, if not always admitted, factor in many Fourth 
Amendment decisions.  After the Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois 
v. Wardlow,30 the totality-of-the-circumstances test has devolved into a 
test that is met with two factors:  high-crime area and unprovoked 
flight from police.31  Other courts have required even less.  Thus, the 
first Part seeks to establish the importance of getting the term right. 
Part II demonstrates that despite its importance, there is no 
definitional clarity to the “high-crime area” term now regularly used 
by the courts post-Wardlow.  In reviewing court opinions, most 
striking is the lack of consistent analysis about the requirements of 
high-crime areas.32  While some courts have questioned the lack of 
objective basis for the term33 and have cautioned about over-reliance 
on its use, few courts have sought to define the term.  The second 
Part sets out the problem faced by trial courts and lawyers litigating 
the issue in the Fourth Amendment context. 
 28. See JOHN MARKOVIC & CHRISTOPHER STONE, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, CRIME 
MAPPING AND THE POLICING OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES 7 (2000), available at 
http://www.vera.org/publication_pdf/156_232.pdf (recognizing that computerized 
crime mapping is used to measure police performance and solve specific crime 
problems). 
 29. This Article focuses on the narrow question of Fourth Amendment law.  
However, other scholars have recognized the larger societal benefit of crime 
mapping technologies.  See id. at 1 (“Crime mapping offers a powerful way for police 
and the public to define the patterns of crime that the police must address and track 
how police actions affect crime.  The maps allow constables and street officers, their 
senior commanders, and public representatives to develop a common picture of 
crime in an area, incorporate other information that may help explain crime 
patterns and suggest solutions, and then monitor changes over time.  In short, crime 
mapping can make democratic policing not only possible, but practical.”). 
 30. 528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
 31. See id. at 124–25 (finding that defendant’s presence in an “area known for 
heavy narcotics trafficking” combined with defendant’s unprovoked flight from 
police created reasonable suspicion that justified the officers’ stop of defendant). 
 32. Compare United States v. Wright, 485 F.3d 45, 53–54 (1st Cir. 2007), with 
United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 216 (3d Cir. 2004).  These cases are discussed 
in detail in Part II of this Article. 
 33. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(Kozinski, J., concurring).  The Montero-Camargo case is discussed infra at Part II. 
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Part III proposes a solution to the ambiguity, by requiring an 
empirical and verifiable factual basis to support the assertion that an 
area or neighborhood is a “high-crime area” before that information 
may be used to evaluate a Fourth Amendment stop.  This evidence of 
the character of the area must be specific to the crime charged.  
Furthermore, this objectively based knowledge must not only be 
known to the individual officer, but must be known before making the 
contested Fourth Amendment stop.  In this way, the character of the 
area will be directly and relevantly linked to the otherwise ambiguous 
actions observed by the police officer.  This objective factual basis can 
be established with existing data regularly collected by law 
enforcement organizations.  Intriguingly, this solution was suggested 
by the National Association of Police Organizations, Policemen 
Benevolent and Protective Association of Illinois (“NAPO”) in its 
amicus brief before the Supreme Court in the Wardlow case.34
The concluding section of the Article summarizes the benefits of 
providing definitional clarity to the term “high-crime area” and the 
benefits of requiring the government to produce empirical evidence 
of the area’s relevant characteristics.  With increasing technological 
sophistication, including crime mapping and data collection, “high-
crime areas” can become an established fact to be decided by courts.  
The result will be a more consistent and fair application of 
constitutional principles.  In addition, it may offer additional benefits 
to law enforcement and community organizations.  Empirical data 
and consistent definitions for high-crime areas would help guarantee 
that all citizens share the same Fourth Amendment protections. 
I.  HIGH-CRIME AREAS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S REASONABLE 
SUSPICION REQUIREMENT 
A.  The History of the Use of the Term “High-Crime Area”  
in the Supreme Court 
A brief review of the Supreme Court case law from Terry v. Ohio35 to 
Wardlow v. Illinois36 demonstrates that the “high-crime area” concept 
has grown in acceptance, if not doctrinal clarity in recent decades.  
The characterization of a neighborhood as a “high-crime area” has 
 34. Brief for National Ass’n of Police Organizations et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 7, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (No. 98-1036), 
1999 WL 451226, at *7 [hereinafter NAPO Amicus Brief]. 
 35. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 36. 528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
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developed into an important factor for determining reasonable 
suspicion.37
1.  Terry v. Ohio 
As is well established, prior to Terry, all Fourth Amendment 
searches and seizures on the street had to be supported by probable 
cause.38  Terry operated as a turning point in Fourth Amendment 
analysis.39  For the first time, the Court allowed law enforcement the 
ability to search and seize individuals on less than probable cause.  A 
new test of reasonableness was put forth to balance the government’s 
need to deter crime and the citizens’ interest in rights of personal 
privacy against governmental invasion.40  The Court articulated a two-
prong analysis:  first, whether the stop was reasonable,41 and second, 
whether the search was likewise reasonable.42  To satisfy the 
 37. See Raymond, supra note 23, at 100 (“Characterization of that neighborhood 
as a ‘high crime area’ or one ‘known for drug trafficking’ is often critical to the 
finding of reasonable suspicion.”). 
 38. E.g., California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 635 (1991) (“Prior to Terry, the 
Fourth Amendment proscribed any seizure of the person that was not supported by 
the same probable-cause showing that would justify a custodial arrest.”). 
 39. See Harris, supra note 21, at 661 (“Terry v. Ohio broke new ground.  For the 
first time, the Supreme Court allowed searches and seizures in traditional on-the-
street encounters between police and citizens with less than probable cause.”). 
 40. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22. 
 41. Concerning the reasonableness of the stop, the Terry Court found that the 
governmental need in this case was “effective crime prevention and detection,” which 
“underlies the recognition that a police officer may in appropriate circumstances 
and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating 
possibly criminal behavior” without probable cause to arrest.  Id. at 22.  The Court 
found that none of Terry’s actions, taken individually, would compel a finding of 
reasonable suspicion.  See id. at 22–23 (“There is nothing unusual in two men 
standing together on a street corner, perhaps waiting for someone.  Nor is there 
anything suspicious about people in such circumstances strolling up and down the 
street, singly or in pairs.  Store windows, moreover, are made to be looked in.”).  
However, the Court found in that the aggregate, the present circumstances 
“warranted further investigation.”  Id. at 22.  The Court did not reach a conclusion 
about whether this action was reasonable or not, and therefore, there was no finding 
that the stop itself was reasonable.  See id. at 20 n.16 (“We thus decide nothing today 
concerning the constitutional propriety of an investigative ‘seizure’ upon less than 
probable cause for purposes of ‘detention’ and/or interrogation.  Obviously, not all 
personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves ‘seizures’ of persons.  
Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some 
way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.  
We cannot tell with any certainty upon this record whether any such ‘seizure’ took 
place here prior to Officer McFadden’s initiation of physical contact for purposes of 
searching Terry for weapons, and we thus may assume that up to that point no 
intrusion upon constitutionally protected rights had occurred.”). 
 42. Concerning the reasonableness of the search, the Court announced a two-
prong test:  “[W]hether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether 
it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 
interference in the first place.”  Id. at 20. 
When an officer is investigating suspicious behavior, another governmental 
interest comes into play—the safety of the officer.  Id. at 23.  The Court held that due 
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requirement of reasonableness, the government was required to 
demonstrate objective evidence that would “‘warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was 
appropriate.”43  Since “there is ‘no ready test for determining 
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] 
against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails,’”44 the 
Court first looked to the governmental interest affected.  In Terry, the 
Court found that the governmental interest was “effective crime 
prevention and detection.”45  Contrasting this governmental interest 
was the individual’s right to be free from governmental intrusion, 
since even a simple pat-down is “a serious intrusion upon the sanctity 
of the person.”46  The Court’s initial determination on what was 
reasonable is now well-established.  Objective reasonableness is to be 
based on “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 
reasonable inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that 
intrusion.”47  When evaluating the reasonable inferences, the 
reviewing court must consider the officer’s experience and “due 
weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized 
suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which 
to the potential for violence, “it would be unreasonable to require that police officers 
take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties.”  Id.  The officer may not 
search a suspicious person in all circumstances; the officer must be “justified in 
believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close 
range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others,” in order to 
search the suspect.  Id. at 24.  However, an officer does not have to be certain that 
the suspect is presently armed and dangerous.  Rather, the inquiry is “whether a 
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that 
his safety or that of others was in danger.”  Id. at 27.  The Court found that since 
Officer McFadden had reasonable suspicion that the suspects were planning an 
armed robbery, “it [was] reasonable to assume,” that the robbery would “be likely to 
involve the use of weapons . . . .”  Id. at 28.  Therefore, Officer McFadden could 
reasonably conclude that the suspects were presently armed and dangerous.  Id.  
Counterbalancing the governmental need of officer security is the citizen’s right to 
be free from governmental “intrusion upon cherished personal security[,]” even if 
only in limited searches.  Id. at 24–25.  Therefore, the search must be “reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first 
place.”  Id. at 20.  In order to be reasonably related, the Court created “a narrowly 
drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the 
police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and 
dangerous individual.”  Id. at 27.  The search must be “confined in scope to an 
intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden 
instruments for the assault of the police officer,” id. at 29, and not for the purpose of 
“prevent[ing] the disappearance or destruction of evidence of crime.”  Id.  Since 
Officer McFadden limited his protective search to a pat-down of the outer clothing of 
appellants, the Court found that the search was reasonably related and thus satisfied 
the second prong.  Id. at 29–30. 
 43. Id. at 22. 
 44. Id. at 21 (internal citations omitted). 
 45. Id. at 22. 
 46. Id. at 17. 
 47. Id. at 21. 
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he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.”48  This 
necessarily results in a case-by-case analysis.49  It is within this case-by-
case factual analysis that the nature of the area in which the stop 
occurs becomes of central concern. 
2.  High-crime areas after Terry 
Over the years of interpreting the Terry rule, the Supreme Court 
determined that one of the “facts” that could be articulated was the 
character of the area in which officers saw the suspicious actions.  In 
1972, the Court decided Adams v. Williams50 and made its first 
reference to the nature of the neighborhood as being relevant to the 
reasonable suspicion calculus.  In determining whether to uphold a 
stop based on less than probable cause, the Court stated, “[w]hile 
properly investigating the activity of a person who was reported to be 
carrying narcotics and a concealed weapon and who was sitting alone 
in a car in a high-crime area at 2:15 in the morning, Sgt. Connolly had 
ample reason to fear for his safety,” and summarily search appellant.51  
In Adams, the Court reiterated that “a police officer may in 
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a 
person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even 
though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.”52  The Court 
broadened Terry to include not only personally observed facts, but 
also facts relayed to the officer by an informant, specifically rejecting 
the argument that “reasonable cause for a stop and frisk can only be 
based on the officer’s personal observation.”53  The Court also 
modified Terry by including the characterization of the area as a high-
crime area as an articulable fact to be taken into account in 
determining the reasonableness of the search.  However, the Court 
provided no guidance as to the meaning of the term “high-crime 
area.”54
 48. Id. at 27. 
 49. Id. at 29. 
 50. 407 U.S. 143 (1972). 
 51. Id. at 147–48 (emphasis added). 
 52. Id. at 145 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 24).  Similar to Terry, there was little 
analysis of the justification for the stop itself; instead the Court focused on the 
propriety of the search.  See id. at 147 (stating simply that “the information [provided 
by the informant] carried enough indicia of reliability to justify the officer’s forcible 
stop”).  Justice Marshall’s dissent notes that “the testimony of the arresting officer in 
the instant case patently fails to demonstrate that the informant was known to be 
trustworthy and since it is also clear that the officer had no idea of the source of the 
informant’s ‘knowledge,’ a search and seizure would have been illegal.”  Id. at 157 
(Marshall, J., dissenting).  Justice Marshall further characterized the tip as 
“unreliable, unsubstantiated, conclusory hearsay.”  Id. at 159. 
 53. Id. at 147 (majority opinion). 
 54. Id. 
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With this beginning, the Supreme Court began recognizing the 
character of the neighborhood in more explicit ways.  In United States 
v. Brignoni-Ponce,55 the Court was faced with another Terry issue, this 
time involving the stop of a car along the U.S.-Mexico border.56  The 
Court in Brignoni-Ponce framed the issue as balancing the public 
interest, which “demands effective measures to prevent the illegal 
entry of aliens at the Mexican border,”57 against the interference with 
“individual liberty that results when an officer stops an automobile 
and questions its occupants.”58  The Court in Brignoni-Ponce, after 
reviewing Terry and Adams, held that the first prong of the Terry 
analysis is satisfied “when an officer’s observations lead him 
reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens who 
are illegally in the country.”59  In order to satisfy Terry’s second prong, 
“[t]he officer may question the driver and passengers about their 
citizenship and immigration status, and he may ask them to explain 
suspicious circumstances, but any further detention or search must 
be based on consent or probable cause.”60  After rejecting the 
argument that race alone could satisfy the Terry standard, the Court 
noted that: 
 Officers may consider the characteristics of the area in which they 
encounter a vehicle.  Its proximity to the border, the usual patterns 
of traffic on the particular road, and previous experience with alien 
traffic are all relevant.  They also may consider information about 
recent illegal border crossings in the area.61
In relying on the location of the stop, the Court gave legitimating 
effect to the “high-crime area” reasoning in Adams.62
In Brown v. Texas,63 the Court was asked to decide whether being 
confronted in a high-crime area alone was enough to justify a Terry 
stop.64  The Court reviewed the oft-repeated balancing test, and noted 
that the determination necessarily involves weighing “the gravity of 
 55. 422 U.S. 873 (1975). 
 56. Id. at 874. 
 57. Id. at 878. 
 58. Id. at 879. 
 59. Id. at 881. 
 60. Id. at 881–82. 
 61. Id. at 884–85 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
 62. The Court held that when determining the reasonableness of the officer’s 
conduct, “each case must turn on the totality of the particular circumstances,” a test 
which was elaborated on in further cases.  Id. at 885 n.10; see United States v. Cortez, 
449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1980) (explaining that the “totality of circumstances” must 
lead to a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person 
stopped of criminal activity”). 
 63. 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
 64. Id. at 52. 
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the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the 
seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the 
interference with individual liberty.”65  The officers in Brown could 
only say that the appellant “looked suspicious,” but could not 
articulate why he looked suspicious; the Court, therefore, eliminated 
this factor from consideration.66  The only other factor the officer 
gave was that the appellant was in a high-crime area.67  The Court 
held that, standing alone, being in a high-crime area was “not a basis 
for concluding that appellant himself was engaged in criminal 
conduct,”68 because the “appellant’s activity was no different from the 
activity of other pedestrians in that neighborhood.”69  While stating 
that being in a high-crime area is insufficient to show reasonable 
suspicion, the Court did not exclude the factor from consideration, 
so long as the officer could point to other facts that differentiated the 
suspect from the community at large.70
In United States v. Cortez,71 the Court took the opportunity to refine 
what it meant by the “totality of the circumstances” test in the context 
of reasonable suspicion.72  Cortez involved the investigatory stop of an 
 65. See id. at 51 (noting that the Fourth Amendment requires “specific, objective 
facts indicating that society’s legitimate interests require the seizure of the particular 
individual or that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying 
explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers”). 
 66. Id. at 52. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 52. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. at 52 n.2 (“This situation is to be distinguished from the observations 
of a trained, experienced police officer who is able to perceive and articulate 
meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the untrained 
observer.”).  Professor Raymond points out that mere probability, even a statistical 
probability, cannot alone be sufficient for reasonable suspicion: 
Something more than a purely probabilistic inference of suspicion based on 
statistical likelihoods must be present to justify a stop.  Consider a 
hypothetical that concluded that, in a particular neighborhood, one person 
in three was likely to be in possession of unlawful narcotics at any given time.  
The probability that an individual in that neighborhood was in possession of 
narcotics would be 33-1/3%. Notwithstanding the percentages (which would 
appear to satisfy the probability requirements of the reasonable suspicion 
standard), reasonable suspicion would not exist as to each individual in the 
neighborhood.  Some particularized observations—proof that implicates an 
identified individual—must also be offered in support of the claim of 
reasonable suspicion. 
Raymond, supra note 23, at 105–06. 
 71. 449 U.S. 411 (1980). 
 72. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 n.10 (1975).  This totality 
of the circumstances test includes two parts.  Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.  First, the Court 
must look at all the facts and circumstances, whether from objective observations, 
police reports, or informants as well as take “consideration of the modes or patterns 
of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers.”  Id.  Then, taking this objective data, “a 
trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions . . . that might well elude an 
untrained person.”  Id.  These inferences are not to be seen and weighed by scholars, 
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automobile suspected of transporting illegal aliens.73  The Court 
reiterated that “[a]n investigatory stop must be justified by some 
objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, 
engaged in criminal activity.”74  Part of the totality relied on by the 
Court was the fact that this location was known for a particular type of 
illegal activity.  In Cortez, the suspicion focused on areas of known 
illegal immigrant traffic, and thus the reasonable suspicion was tied 
to that particular illegal activity.75  The Court deferred to officer 
experience based on a particularized understanding of the local 
landscape.76
B.  Illinois v. Wardlow:  High-Crime Areas and Reasonable Suspicion 
The seminal Supreme Court case on high-crime areas is Illinois v. 
Wardlow.77  In Wardlow, the Court held that unprovoked flight in a 
high-crime area could constitute reasonable suspicion for a Terry 
stop.78  The factual circumstances and basis of the high-crime 
determination are revealing and are addressed in some detail. 
As detailed by the Illinois trial court, the arresting officer, Officer 
Nolan, was in an eight-officer, four-car caravan proceeding along 
West Van Buren Street in Chicago—an area that was “one of the 
“but [are to be] understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.”  Id.  
The second part of the totality of the circumstances test is that the “process just 
described must raise a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is 
engaged in wrongdoing.”  Id. 
 73. See Cortez, 449 U.S. at 413–16 (detailing that stop was based on long-term 
immigration investigation and stopped vehicle fulfilled a number of suspected 
criteria). 
 74. See id. at 417–18 (noting that to determine whether stop is justified, the 
“totality of the circumstances—the whole picture—must be taken into account.  
Based upon that whole picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and 
objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity”). 
 75. See id. at 419 (“Of critical importance, the officers knew that the area was a 
crossing point for illegal aliens.  They knew that it was common practice for persons 
to lead aliens through the desert from the border to Highway 86, where they could—
by prearrangement—be picked up by a vehicle.”). 
 76. See id. at 418 (recognizing that “the evidence thus collected must be seen and 
weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those 
versed in the field of law enforcement”). 
 77. 528 U.S. 119 (2000); see, e.g., Debra Meek Nelson, Illinois v. Wardlow:  A 
Single Factor Totality, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 509, 510 (2001) (arguing that Wardlow is 
“unprecedented in light of past Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding 
reasonable suspicion and the significance of flight”); Ronner, supra note 19, at 384 
(arguing that Wardlow “makes the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule, a 
principal means of curtailing police lawlessness, virtually inapplicable to the very 
minority communities that need it the most”); Walsh, supra note 20, at 879 
(explaining that Wardlow’s importance rests in its use of “unprovoked flight” and 
“high-crime area” as the factors used to determine reasonable suspicion). 
 78. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 119. 
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areas in the 11th District that’s high [in] narcotics traffic.”79  Officer 
Nolan and his partner were in uniform, although he could not recall 
whether any other officer was in uniform and he could not recollect 
whether his car, or any other in the caravan, was marked.80  The 
officers observed the defendant standing along West Van Buren 
Street, violating no laws.81  When the defendant looked in the 
officers’ direction, he fled through an alley and gangway with a white 
plastic bag under his arm.82  Officer Nolan pursued the defendant 
until the defendant eventually ran towards the officers’ car and was 
forced to stop.83  Officer Nolan immediately conducted a pat-down of 
the defendant and the bag both because he could not see inside the 
plastic bag,84 and because in his experience, “it was common to find 
weapons in the vicinity of such [high-crime] areas.”85  Officer Nolan 
“felt a hard object that had a similar shape to a revolver or a gun,” 
which was “very heavy.”86  Upon finding a .38-caliber handgun with 
five live rounds inside the bag, Officer Nolan arrested the 
defendant.87
Wardlow moved to suppress the gun at trial and lost.88  On appeal, 
the Illinois Court of Appeals discounted the “high-crime area” factor 
of the Fourth Amendment calculus, and because the only other 
factor was flight, reversed.89  The court found that Officer Nolan’s 
testimony lacked specificity as to the particular area in which the 
defendant was located, and questioned whether the defendant ran 
because he thought that the officers were focusing on him.90  
Additionally, the court was concerned with the lack of evidence that 
established the area as a high-crime area,91 and found “no support in 
the record for the contention that defendant was in a high-crime 
location.”92  The court noted that the location of an incident can be a 
 79. People v. Wardlow (Wardlow I), 678 N.E.2d 65, 66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997), aff’d, 
701 N.E.2d 484 (Ill. 1998), rev’d, 528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
 80. Id. at 66. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id.  It was unknown whether the defendant actually saw any of the officers, 
their cars, or their uniforms.  Id. 
 83. See id. (detailing that no other cars in the caravan were involved in the stop). 
 84. Id. at 66. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 68. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. at 67 (“The record here is simply too vague to support the inference 
that defendant was in a location with a high incidence of narcotics trafficking . . . .”). 
 92. Id. at 67–68. 
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factor in the determination of reasonable suspicion,93 and together 
with flight, may provide reasonable suspicion,94 but stated that in 
order to “pass constitutional muster . . . the high crime area should 
be a sufficiently localized and identifiable location.”95
The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed with the analysis of the court 
of appeals, but affirmed the reversal of the trial court on different 
grounds.96  First, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the court of 
appeals’ determination that the testimony did not establish that the 
area was a high-crime area, finding that it was a high-crime area.97  
The Illinois Supreme Court then reconsidered the issue of whether 
flight in a high-crime area provides reasonable suspicion for a Terry 
stop.  The court first surveyed other jurisdictions and found that the 
majority of courts held that “flight alone is insufficient to justify a 
Terry stop.”98  The court held that flight in a high-crime area alone is 
not enough, acknowledging that other “courts require proof of some 
independently suspicious circumstance to corroborate the inference 
of a guilty conscience associated with flight at the sight of the 
police.”99  After emphasizing the importance of protecting the 
freedom to engage in such harmless activities as “loafing, loitering, 
and nightwalking,”100 and “the right to travel, to locomotion, to 
freedom of movement, and to associate with others,”101 as well as the 
“right of law-abiding citizens to eschew interactions with the police,”102 
the court reasoned that “[i]f the police cannot constitutionally force 
otherwise law-abiding citizens to move, the police cannot force those 
 93. See id. at 68 (“[A] high crime area is a place in which the character of the 
area gives color to conduct which might not otherwise raise the suspicion of an 
officer.”) (citations omitted). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. People v. Wardlow (Wardlow II), 701 N.E.2d 484 (Ill. 1998), rev’d, 528 U.S. 
119 (2000). 
 97. See id. at 486 (“[W]e believe Officer Nolan’s uncontradicted and undisputed 
testimony, which was accepted by the trial court, was sufficient to establish that the 
incident occurred in a high-crime area.”). 
 98. See id. at 486 (citing State v. Hicks, 488 N.W.2d 359, 362 (Neb. 1992)); see also 
State v. Tucker, 642 A.2d 401, 407 (N.J. 1994) (“Although flight is evidence that a 
fact finder may consider in assessing guilt . . . [it must] be accompanied by some 
evidence of criminality.”). 
 99. Wardlow II, 701 N.E.2d at 486 (citing Hicks, 488 N.W.2d at 363); see also State 
v. Sullivan, 203 A.2d 177, 192 (N.J. 1964) (“[F]or departure to take on the legal 
significance of flight, there must be some circumstances present and unexplained 
which, in conjunction with the leaving, reasonably justify an inference that it was 
done with a consciousness of guilt and pursuant to an effort to avoid an accusation 
based on that guilt.”). 
 100. Wardlow II, 701 N.E.2d at 487 (citations omitted). 
 101. Id. (citations omitted). 
 102. Id. (citing Hicks, 488 N.W.2d at 364). 
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same citizens to stand still at the appearance of an officer.”103  After 
finding no other corroborating facts to support the inference of “a 
consciousness of guilt,” the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the lower 
court and ordered the gun suppressed.104
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Illinois Supreme 
Court.105  After noting that presence in a high-crime area alone is not 
enough to support reasonable suspicion,106 the Court reiterated that it 
is nonetheless a salient factor to be considered because “[o]fficers are 
not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in 
determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to 
warrant further investigation.”107  The Court then noted that evasive 
conduct can also be used in the reasonable suspicion calculus, and 
found that “[h]eadlong flight . . . is the consummate act of evasion:  
It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly 
suggestive of such.”108  The Court confirmed that citizens indeed have 
the right to go “about one’s business” and cannot be forcibly 
detained and that refusal to cooperate cannot be a factor for 
reasonable suspicion.109  However, the Court went on to reject the 
Illinois Supreme Court’s interpretation of flight by stating that 
“unprovoked flight is simply not a mere refusal to cooperate.”110  
Indeed, “[f]light, by its very nature, is not ‘going about one’s 
business’; in fact, it is just the opposite.”111  The Court rejected the 
notion that because many innocent reasons exist for flight from the 
police, flight is not necessarily indicative of ongoing criminal activity 
by noting that conduct such as flight may well be ambiguous, but that 
“Terry recognized that the officers could detain the individuals to 
resolve the ambiguity.”112  The majority also reasoned that because 
“courts do not have available empirical studies dealing with 
inferences drawn from suspicious behavior . . . we cannot reasonably 
demand scientific certainty from judges or law enforcement officers 
where none exists.”113  Therefore, “the determination of reasonable 
 103. Id. 
 104. See id. at 486, 488 (noting “that defendant herein gave no outward indication 
of involvement in illicit activity prior to the approach of Officer Nolan’s vehicle,” and 
therefore “the officers lacked an articulable basis for suspecting defendant of 
involvement in criminal activity prior to the point at which he turned and ran”). 
 105. Illinois v. Wardlow (Wardlow III), 528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
 106. Id. at 124 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 53 (1979)). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 125. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 124–25. 
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suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences 
about human behavior.”114  Part of that analysis, of course, is the 
neighborhood in which the events take place.  The Court concluded 
that in a high-crime area, the type of unprovoked flight is sufficient 
for reasonable suspicion. 
The questions left unanswered by the Supreme Court’s analysis of 
the high-crime area in Wardlow are considerable.  While it no doubt 
makes sense to consider the location in which suspicious activities are 
observed, the major unresolved question is how lower courts should 
consider that location.  The next section discusses the impact of 
Wardlow on courts struggling to define a high-crime area for Fourth 
Amendment purposes. 
II.  A STRUGGLE FOR DEFINITIONS AND PROOF POST-WARDLOW 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Wardlow, courts can consider 
whether an area is a high-crime area in a Fourth Amendment 
reasonable suspicion calculus.  Courts began labeling areas as high-
crime without settling on a definition.  For example, some courts 
have defined a high-crime area as an area of “expected criminal 
activity,”115 which fits within the language of Wardlow.116  Other courts 
have described it as an area known for drug activity, or one under 
surveillance.117  Still other courts have held that a high-crime area is 
one that is “riddled with narcotics dealings and drug-related 
shootings.”118  Some courts have found that a “crime wave” can create 
a high-crime area.119  Being an area which is “notorious” or has a 
reputation for illegal conduct can also qualify an area as high-
crime.120  Areas “plagued by gang-related shootings, drug dealing, 
 114. Id. at 125. 
 115. See United States v. Baskin, 401 F.3d 788, 791, 793 (7th Cir. 2005) (rejecting 
the defendant’s claim that “the government must produce ‘specific data’ establishing 
that a location is a ‘high-crime area’ for this inference of criminality to be drawn 
from the defendant’s flight,” and holding that location is relevant, not in a well 
particularized “high-crime area” but rather an area of “expected criminal activity”). 
 116. See Wardlow III, 528 U.S. at 124 (“[P]resence in an area of expected criminal 
activity.”). 
 117. State v. Biehl, No. 22054, 2004 WL 2806340, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 8, 
2004). 
 118. Cunningham v. State, 884 So. 2d 1121, 1122 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
 119. State v. Donnell, 239 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Iowa 1976). 
 120. See People v. Davis, 815 N.E.2d 92, 98–99 (Ill. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that 
“there was no evidence that the area around the convenience store was a ‘high crime 
area’ or notorious for any type of criminal activity”); Slayton v. Commonwealth, 582 
S.E.2d 448, 449 (Va. Ct. App. 2003) (noting “the reputation of the location as a ‘high 
crime area’ notorious for drug transactions”).  But see State v. Hollimon, 900 So. 2d 
999, 1004 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (putting higher emphasis on areas that are “notorious” 
for certain crimes rather than areas that are simply “known for high crime and high 
drug trafficking activity”). 
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assaults, and robberies” may also be termed high-crime areas.121  This 
“hodgepodge”122 of definitions demonstrates the importance of the 
high-crime area label without actually clarifying what it means.  How 
does one know one is in a high-crime area?  How is the 
determination that a location is a high-crime area made?  These 
questions are still unanswered.  As Judge Kozinski of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized, “[t]he 
question is not whether the characteristics of the area may be taken 
into account, but how these characteristics are established.”123  This 
section seeks to explore the definitional problem of the “high-crime 
area” terminology. 
A.  High-Crime Characteristics 
The term “high-crime area,” for Fourth Amendment purposes, 
expresses certain causal assumptions.  First, most criminal cases 
involving Fourth Amendment concerns take place in a physical, 
geographical location.124  Generally, this is a neighborhood, a street, 
an intersection, a police district, or a particularized geographic area.  
Second, this physical location can be compared to other locations 
that have a different level of criminal activity.125  “High” would be a 
meaningless term if there did not exist lower areas of criminal 
activity.  Third, it is assumed that some evidence can be presented to 
establish that an area is a “high-crime area.”126  Beyond these basic 
assumptions, however, there is little agreement on how courts should 
evaluate claims that certain areas merit a high-crime designation. 
 121. United States v. Rogers, No. Crim. 10-10313, 2005 WL 478001, at *1 (D. Mass. 
Mar. 1, 2005); see also United States v. Ford, 333 F.3d 839, 841 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(finding that a skating rink could be a high-crime area because “gang members have 
been known to patronize the rink, and screwdrivers and knives have been found by 
the owner near the Roller Dome’s dumpster”). 
 122. See Raymond, supra note 23, at 100 (“[C]ourts, however, have little guidance 
as to how to consider the [high-crime area] factor.  The result is a hodgepodge of 
inconsistent and incoherent case law.”). 
 123. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1143 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(Kozinski, J., concurring). 
 124. For example, each of the cases discussed in Part I involve a factual scenario 
out of the physical world, be it District 11 in Chicago or on the United States-Mexico 
border.  High-crime areas would necessarily be different if we were talking about 
cyber crime, or non-physical searches.  For purposes of this Article we will focus on 
the physical world and regular police-citizen face-to-face encounters. 
 125. Implicit in the term “high-crime area” is a comparison between areas with 
differing levels of crime.  Presumably there should also be “low-crime areas” and 
“medium-crime areas.”  However, such designations do not appear in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  As will be discussed later, the need to accurately 
determine high-crime areas will necessitate the creation (or recognition) of other 
areas with lesser criminal activity. 
 126. This question is the central focus of this Article. 
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In reviewing the cases that have addressed the definitional problem 
of a high-crime area, three questions emerge:  (1) what type of 
evidence should courts require to determine if an area is a high-
crime area; (2) what standard of proof should courts adopt to 
evaluate that metric of crime; and (3) how should courts cabin the 
“area” so designated to make it a meaningful and relevant description 
for Fourth Amendment purposes.  These three questions of the 
method of proof, standard of proof, and geographic and temporal 
scope help unravel the question Judge Kozinski posed about how we 
establish the characteristics of a high-crime area. 
1.  Method of proof 
The first issue—highlighted in Wardlow itself—is what proof do we 
require for a high-crime area to be considered a high-crime area?  
Can a police officer’s subjective belief be sufficient, or should there 
be some objective data put into evidence?  Appropriately enough, the 
Illinois state courts debated the empirical basis of whether Mr. 
Wardlow was standing in a high-crime area.127  The Illinois Court of 
Appeals questioned the empirical basis for the assumption, finding 
the record vague on the question of whether Wardlow was in an area 
known for narcotics trafficking.128  In contrast, the Illinois Supreme 
Court simply accepted the trial court’s finding that the officer’s 
uncontested testimony established that it was a high-narcotics area.129
Similarly, the majority of jurisdictions pre- and post-Wardlow 
primarily have relied on an officer’s testimony that an area is a “high-
crime area” without much analysis as to the basis of that conclusion.  
Some jurisdictions allow inexact reports of arrests to qualify an area 
as a “high-crime area,” sometimes as limited as “several [prior] . . . 
 127. Compare People v. Wardlow (Wardlow II), 701 N.E.2d 484, 486 (Ill. 1998), 
rev’d, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (“[W]e believe Officer Nolan’s uncontradicted and 
undisputed testimony, which was accepted by the trial court, was sufficient to 
establish that the incident occurred in a high-crime area.”), with People v. Wardlow 
(Wardlow I), 678 N.E.2d 65, 67 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997), aff’d, 701 N.E.2d 484 (Ill. 1998), 
rev’d, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) ([Officer Nolan’s testimony that] “the area[] . . . had ‘high 
narcotics traffic’ . . . indicates only that the officers were headed somewhere in the 
general area.  There was no evidence that the officers were investigating the specific 
area where defendant had been standing or that any of the police cars had stopped 
at that location or that defendant had any basis for believing that police were 
interested in his activity.”), and id. (“The record here is simply too vague to support 
the inference that defendant was in a location with a high incidence of narcotics 
trafficking . . . .”). 
 128. Wardlow I, 678 N.E.2d at 67. 
 129. Wardlow II, 701 N.E.2d at 486.  Of course, absent some heightened standard 
of proof (as proposed in this Article), this is the expected legal consequence of 
uncontested testimony. 
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arrests.”130  Other jurisdictions accept officer opinion testimony that is 
based on subjective beliefs or experience that the area is a “high-
crime area” with no corroborating facts.131  Some jurisdictions require 
a bit more factual proof, either departmental findings,132 citizen 
complaints,133 or the prior number of arrests that the testifying officer 
has made.134  A few courts even have taken judicial notice that an area 
is a “high-crime area.”135  As one might guess, because no court has 
 130. See United States v. Lovelace, 357 F. Supp. 2d 39, 43 (D.D.C. 2004) 
(reasoning that officer making several prior arrests for narcotics coupled with 
residents’ complaints of narcotics dealing created a “high-crime area.”); see also 
United States v. Pittman, 102 F. App’x 315, 316 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting officer’s 
testimony that specific area of arrest was not “high-crime area” but was “across the 
street from [a housing complex], where [there were] quite a few shootings and . . . 
quite a few homicides”); Burkett v. State, 736 N.E.2d 304, 305 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) 
(“From previous arrests [that the officer] had made in the area, [the officer] knew 
the neighborhood to have a high incidence of drug trafficking.”); State v. Blackstock, 
598 S.E.2d 412, 414 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (“[Unparticularized] statistical data 
indicated this area had a problem with robberies and break-in and enterings.”).  
 131. See, e.g., State v. Morgan, 539 N.W.2d 887, 891–92 (Wis. 1995) (“[I]f the state 
wants the Court to rely on a high-crime area theory in justifying a Terry pat down, 
there has to be a clear and specific record made.  I’ve discussed this issue at length 
and reviewed the applicable cases and reviewed the problems we will face if we simply 
say whenever police are in a high-crime area, they have a right to frisk.  Maybe that’s 
reasonable in this day and age but if it is going to be done, it’s going to have to be 
done with some clear and specific rules which we don’t have right now.” (quoting the 
trial court judge)).  The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that an “officer’s 
perception of an area as ‘high-crime’ can be a factor justifying a search” and rejected 
the district court’s call for clarity and specificity in determining what a “high-crime 
area” actually is. Id. at 892; see also Riley v. Commonwealth, 412 S.E.2d 724, 726 (Va. 
Ct. App. 1992) (noting that officer simply testified that defendant “was in a high 
crime area late at night”). 
 132. See, e.g., State v. Arellano, No. A-04-060, 2004 WL 1151984, at *1 (Neb. Ct. 
App. May 25, 2004) (“[The officer] testified [that], based on briefings and 
discussions with members of the State Patrol and other law enforcement officers, 
[the area was] one where crimes against property and persons frequently take 
place.”). 
 133. See, e.g., State v. Collins, 890 So. 2d 616, 619 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (pointing out 
that narcotics division “received frequent complaints about crime in the vicinity of 
[arrest]”); Commonwealth v. Blair, 860 A.2d 567, 570 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) 
(indicating that arresting officer received numerous complaints about this address in 
the past); Commonwealth v. McClease, 750 A.2d 320, 323 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) 
(noting that officers received generalized complaints about area involving alcohol, 
guns, and drugs). 
 134. See, e.g., People v. Aldridge, 674 P.2d 240, 241 (Cal. 1984) (noting that 
arresting officer “had made more than two hundred arrests in the area”); Lee v. 
State, 868 So. 2d 577, 578 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that officer “had made 
fifteen to twenty drug arrests at that corner”); State v. Scott, 561 So. 2d 170, 172 (La. 
Ct. App. 1990) (pointing out that in this particular area, officer “personally made 
over forty arrests for drug-related offenses”); Gamble v. State, 8 S.W.3d 452, 453 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (“[P]olice had been called either to this area or the residence 
about 70 times in a year, including many ‘disturbance calls’ and calls for trespassing,” 
[but noting that] “[n]either [arresting] officer had ever arrested anyone there for 
drugs or weapons.”). 
 135. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 994 F.2d 317, 322 n.1 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(concluding that trial judge did not improperly take judicial notice that police 
encounter occurred in high-crime area); United States v. Four Million, Two 
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required a threshold level of arrests or complaints, what is termed a 
“high-crime area” can differ from case to case, and jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.136
Only recently have courts recognized the need for a more 
structured method of proof.  The Ninth Circuit was one of the first 
federal appellate courts to examine the method and mode of proof 
for establishing a “high-crime area.”  In its first case to address the 
Wardlow “high-crime area” problem,137 the court expressed concern 
that the “high-crime area” factor was being utilized far too often in 
questionable circumstances, and “may well be ‘an invitation to 
trouble,’”138 which “can easily serve as a proxy for race or ethnicity.”139  
In its analysis in Montero-Camargo,140 the en banc court held that “more 
than mere war stories are required to establish the existence of a 
high-crime area.”141  Instead, the court required that “courts . . . 
examine with care the specific data underlying any such assertion.”142
Montero-Camargo presents an interesting introduction to the 
question of the “method of proof” because, while critical of officers 
relying on past “war stories” about certain areas, the court did not 
rely on much more than these type of war stories to determine that 
Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand, 762 F.2d 895, 904 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting that court 
could properly observe as “common experience consideration” that Miami had 
become a center for drug smuggling and money laundering); In re Malone, 592 F. 
Supp. 1135, 1144 n.3 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (taking judicial notice that housing project was 
high-crime area), aff’d sub nom. Malone v. Fenton, 794 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1986); State 
v. Burns, 877 So. 2d 1073, 1078 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that 6000 block of Field 
Street was previously recognized as high-crime area); State v. Vinet, 576 So. 2d 1200, 
1200 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (taking judicial notice that area known as “Coke alley” was 
known for drugs). 
 136. See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1143 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring).  In Montero-Camargo, Judge Kozinski compares 
the majority’s finding that an average of “[one] arrest every four months” constituted 
a “high-crime area,” 208 F.3d at 1143  with United States v. Thornton, 197 F.3d 241, 248 
(7th Cir. 1999), which cites officer testimony that there were 2500 narcotics arrests in 
five-block-by-five-block area in less than one year, United States v. Morales, 191 F.3d 
602, 604 (5th Cir. 1999), which indicates the officer testified that he had detained 
600 illegal aliens on same stretch of highway in less than one year, and State v. 
Donnell, 239 N.W.2d 575, 576–77 (Iowa 1976), which notes evidence of residential 
burglaries numbering “almost in the hundreds” during previous year. 
 137. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1143 (Kozinski, J., concurring). 
 138. Id. at 1139 n.32 (majority opinion). 
 139. Id. at 1138.  The Montero-Camargo decision is also notable for its 
abandonment of race or ethnicity as one of the permissible factors for a Terry stop.  
See Ian H. Hlawati, United States v. Montero-Camargo Elimination of the Race Factor 
Develops Piecemeal:  The Ninth Circuit Approach, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 703, 729 (2001) 
(arguing that despite Montero-Camargo’s rejection of race as a factor in the reasonable 
suspicion calculus, police stops based on racial profiling will continue). 
 140. 208 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 141. Id. at 1139 n.32. 
 142. Id. (emphasis added). 
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the site at issue was a high-crime area.  As pointed out in the sharply 
worded concurrence authored by Judge Kozinski, 
 The opinion recognizes the danger in allowing the police to 
characterize an area as “high-crime” to establish a basis for 
reasonable suspicion, but then proceeds to do just that, based on 
nothing more than the personal experiences of two arresting 
agents.  As I discuss above, the agents didn’t even claim this was a 
high crime area, but let’s say they had.  What in this record would 
support their conclusion?  Both agents testified only that they had 
detected criminal violations after stopping people in the area.  How 
often?  One agent said he’d been involved in 15–20 stops over eight 
and a half years, and “[could]n’t recall any . . . where we didn’t 
have a violation of some sort.  The other agent testified to “about a 
dozen” stops in the same period, all but one of which led to an 
arrest. 
 Without hesitation, the majority treats this as a crime wave, but is 
it really?  Does an arrest every four months or so make for a high 
crime area? . . . Can we rely on the vague and undocumented 
recollections of the officers here?  Do the two officers’ figures of 
“15–20” and “about a dozen” reflect separate pools of incidents, or 
do they include some where, as here, both officers were involved? 
Are such estimates sufficiently precise to tell us anything useful 
about the area?  I wouldn’t have thought so, although I could be 
persuaded otherwise.  But my colleagues don’t even pause to ask 
the questions.  To them, it’s a high crime area, because the officers 
say it’s a high crime area.143
The questions posed by Judge Kozinski are the central questions 
surrounding a coherent “high-crime area” jurisprudence.  Logically, a 
trial court making a decision about the character of a neighborhood 
would need certain baseline facts.  What do those numbers mean in 
terms of total arrest numbers?  Clearly, an area with an average of “an 
arrest every four months” sounds unlike a high-crime area that would 
warrant a change in Fourth Amendment analysis.  However, without a 
baseline comparison, the courts and the litigants are simply guessing 
at the import of the numbers.  What if there were an area with four 
arrests a day, or fourteen arrests a day?  Could they all be considered 
“high-crime areas” if the officer said so, or should there be an 
objective measuring of the level of relative crime?  Additionally, as 
can be seen in the vagueness of the numbers (“about a dozen”), even 
the testifying officer is not basing his testimony on a documented 
 143. Id. at 1143 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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record, making cross-examination and verification difficult.  Again as 
Judge Kozinski recognized: 
 Just as a man with a hammer sees every problem as a nail, so a 
man with a badge may see every corner of his beat as a high crime 
area . . . . Police are trained to detect criminal activity and they look 
at the world with suspicious eyes.  This is a good thing, because we 
rely on this suspicion to keep us safe from those who would harm 
us.  But to rely on every cop’s repertoire of war stories to determine 
what is a “high-crime area”—and on that basis to treat otherwise 
innocuous behavior as grounds for reasonable suspicion—strikes 
me as an invitation to trouble.  If the testimony of two officers that 
they made, at most, 32 arrests during the course of a decade is 
sufficient to turn the road here into a high crime area, then what 
area under police surveillance wouldn’t qualify as one?  There are 
street corners in our inner cities that see as much crime within a 
month—even a week.  I would be most reluctant to give police the 
power to turn any area into a high crime area based on their 
unadorned personal experiences.144
Built within the Montero-Camargo decision is a tension about the 
requisite method of proof.  While seeking empirical data, the court 
fails to analyze how the lower courts should evaluate that data.  The 
question is raised but resolved without a satisfactory answer. 
This question of the appropriate method of proof was also 
considered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit in United States v. Bonner.145  In Bonner, the court of appeals was 
faced with a developed factual record in which the question of the 
crime rate of the neighborhood was litigated in the district court.  
The district court found that the contested Fourth Amendment stop 
did not take place in a “high narcotics trafficking area” as the 
prosecution contended.146  At the suppression hearing, the 
prosecution presented evidence indicating that an average of 1.3 
arrests were made per week near the place of the stop and that the 
majority of these were for misdemeanor or summary offenses.147  In 
addition, the prosecution also submitted a news article which 
characterized the housing project at issue as a “high-crime area.”148  
Despite this offer of proof, the district court found that given the 
large amount of people who live in the housing project, the area was 
not high in crime.149  Additionally, the district court noted that the 
 144. Id. 
 145. 363 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 146. Id. at 216. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
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arrests were not largely for narcotics violations as was alleged in the 
indictment, and therefore, even if the arrest rate constituted a “high-
crime area,” the nature of the offenses were not consistent with 
narcotics trafficking.150
The Third Circuit reversed the district court on other grounds, but 
found the “high-crime area” determination was not clearly 
erroneous.151  Of note, Judge Smith specifically raised the issue of 
what method of proof and standard of proof should be required to 
determine the character of the area: 
 I write separately only to highlight an issue implicated in the 
District Court’s fact-finding which we have not been required to 
address:  whether under the flight “plus” analysis of Wardlow . . . the 
government is required to prove the existence of objective criteria 
for what constitutes a high crime area and that the stop occurred in 
such an area, or rather that the government is required to prove 
that officers effecting the stop had a reasonable articulable basis to 
believe that they were in a “high-crime area.”152
The issue to Judge Smith was precisely what information should be 
required for the government to prove a high-crime area.  While the 
court expressly declined to decide the issue, it raised the concern 
about the problem of objective criteria, including the reality of 
incomplete crime reports or unreported reports of crime.153  Again, 
like the Ninth Circuit, the question about the method of proof was 
raised, but deferred to another day. 
A recent case from the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit provides another revealing example in the struggle to define 
the mode of proof for high-crime areas.  In United States v. Wright,154 
the First Circuit remanded with instructions to the district court to 
reconsider its high-crime area finding.  In doing so, it laid out a 
three-part framework for analyzing the issue.155
In Wright, the court was presented with a similar factual situation to 
the Wardlow case.  Specifically, a caravan of police officers in 
unmarked cars pulled up next to the car in which defendant Wright 
was a passenger.156  Upon seeing the police officers, Wright exited the 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 215–16. 
 152. Id. at 218 (Smith, J., concurring). 
 153. See id. at 219 (“[A]n officer is in the position to know the routines and 
patterns of a geographic area, and whether it is more prone to crime.  This 
knowledge may not be reflected on arrest records and log sheets, as arrests are not 
the only indicia of crime.  In any case, we need not resolve the issue here.”). 
 154. 485 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 155. Id. at 53–54. 
 156. Id. at 47. 
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car and ran away.157  The police officers gave chase, stopped Wright 
and then upon searching him, recovered a gun.158  Wright was 
arrested for being a felon in possession of a firearm.159  Wright moved 
to suppress the gun on the ground that the search violated the 
Fourth Amendment. 
During the suppression hearing, the character of the area in which 
the stop occurred became a major point of dispute.  For the 
prosecution, the three officers testified that the area is “a very high 
crime area consisting of firearm violence, drug activity, street 
robberies, breaking and enterings, all type of street crimes.”160  
Officers based their testimony on their own experiences and arrests 
in the area.  However, also during the government’s presentation of 
evidence, the testifying officers referred to biweekly reports kept by 
the Boston Police Department containing detailed statistics about 
crimes in the area.161  In those reports, the Boston Police Department 
designated certain areas as “hot spots” known for their higher 
incidence of criminal activity.162  The defense introduced those 
reports to show that the area in which Wright was arrested was not a 
hot spot, and thus, not a high-crime area as defined by the Boston 
Police Department’s own system.  The trial court admitted its candid 
confusion about whether the area was a high-crime area.  However, 
the court credited the fact that since there was a functioning official 
mapping system that mapped criminal incidents, and the area at issue 
was not in those designated hot spots, the government had not 
demonstrated that the particular area in question was a high-crime 
area.163
On appeal, the First Circuit responded to the trial court’s findings 
by providing an analytical framework to determine high-crime areas.  
The court acknowledged that the question of whether an area is a 
high-crime area is a “factual issue” to be determined by the trial 
court.164  While the appellate court did not express an opinion about 
the trial court’s reliance on the Boston Police Department’s reports, 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id.  
 160. Id. at 49. 
 161. See id. (“Officer Bordley explained how he, and other members of the Youth 
Violence Task Force, determine whether a particular area is a high crime area:  
‘There are weekly and biweekly reports that are done.  They keep stats on what’s 
happening in the city, and they have a meeting every two weeks and they report 
those stats in the meeting.’”). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 49–50. 
 164. See id. at 53 (“We see no reason to treat the character of the stop’s location as 
other than a factual issue.”). 
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it did set forth an analysis that validates the trial court’s finding.  
Specifically, the court recognized that a high-crime area must be 
determined by looking at the connection between the crime at issue 
and the crime the area is known for, the geographic boundaries of 
the area in question, and the temporal proximity between the 
evidence of higher criminal activity and what was seen by the 
officer.165  On remand, the district court was, thus, instructed to 
analyze the proffered contested evidence of the area through this 
framework.166
Disagreement about what constitutes a “high-crime area” is not 
limited to federal courts.  For example, in State v. Morgan,167 the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court grappled with the issue and ended up with 
yet a different answer.168  In Morgan, the district court found a lack of 
a “clear and specific record” to support the officer’s testimony that 
the area was a “high-crime area.”169  On appeal, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court overruled the district court on the issue of what 
constitutes a “high-crime area.”  The Wisconsin Supreme Court held 
that deference should be given to officers, and that “an officer’s 
perception of an area as ‘high-crime’ can be a factor justifying a 
search.”170  The court held that the officer’s testimony was sufficient 
to establish a “high-crime area,” and that the officer need not cite 
crime reports or statistics to validate his belief.171  The dissent in 
Morgan highlighted its concern with this undefined proffer, 
suggesting several ways to firm up otherwise malleable perception of 
the area.  First, the officer should “state the basis for his portrayal of 
the area,”172 and “define the geographic locality about which he was 
speaking.”173  The dissent continued by suggesting that “[s]ome effort 
 165. Id. at 53–54. 
 166. See id. at 54 (“Given the significance of location in evaluating the totality of 
the circumstances . . . and in light of the considerations set forth herein, the district 
court, upon remand, may wish to reevaluate the high crime area issue.  However, we 
wish to be clear that we are not directing the district court to reconsider its high 
crime area finding, and we are not suggesting what that finding should be, if it 
chooses to revisit the issue.”).  
 167. 539 N.W.2d 887 (Wis. 1995). 
 168. Id. 
 169. See id. at 891 (recognizing the lower court’s finding that “if the state wants the 
Court to rely on a high-crime area theory in justifying a Terry pat down, there has to 
be a clear and specific record made”). 
 170. Id. at 892. 
 171. See id. at 895 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (expressing concern with 
majority’s reliance on officer’s testimony that area was “a high crime area, or what I 
would consider [a] high crime area”). 
 172. See id. (“Unspecific assertions that there is a crime problem in a particular 
area should be given little weight . . . .” (citing 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE § 9.3(c), at 457 (2d ed. 1987)). 
 173. Morgan, 539 N.W.2d at 895 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). 
  
2008] THE “HIGH-CRIME AREA” QUESTION 1615 
                                                          
must be made to correlate the specific type of crime allegedly 
endemic to a particular area with the police officer’s reasonable 
suspicion.”174  This concern is similar to the First Circuit’s opinion 
and will be discussed in more detail in the next section. 
The conclusion of this brief overview is that courts are struggling 
with a method of proof to determine what constitutes a high-crime 
area.  While perception and police officer opinion can be useful, they 
may not be accurate or verifiable.  Courts are, thus, debating the 
merits of a more empirical and statistical approach.  As will be 
discussed in Part III, this shift may well be the most practical method 
of creating a useable definition of a high-crime area. 
2.   Standard of proof 
Whether courts rely on officer war stories or official police 
department statistical reports, having a method of proof is only the 
first step.  Courts must also have a standard by which to evaluate that 
proffer of evidence.  In many Fourth Amendment situations, the 
question of the standard of proof is rolled up in the larger Fourth 
Amendment standard of a “preponderance of the evidence.”175  In 
Wardlow, however, the Supreme Court recognized that a reasonable 
suspicion analysis likely rests on a lesser legal standard.176  What 
exactly that lesser standard should look like in the context of a high-
crime area has not been settled by the few courts addressing this 
issue. 
In Bonner, the federal district court applied a “preponderance 
standard,” determining that the government failed to show by a 
preponderance of evidence that the area in question was a high-drug 
area.177  There was no discussion of why the preponderance standard 
was chosen, except it can be inferred that it comports with other 
Fourth Amendment requirements.178  In addition, the preponderance 
 174. Id. 
 175. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 400 F. Supp. 2d 673, 680 (D. Del. 2005) 
(“Considering the totality of this record against the preponderance of the evidence 
standard, the court finds plaintiff has not demonstrated that defendant’s behavior 
gave rise to reasonable suspicion and, as a result, the stop and frisk violated the 
Fourth Amendment.”). 
 176. See Illinois v. Wardlow (Wardlow III), 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (“While 
‘reasonable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause and 
requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth 
Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification . . . .”). 
 177. United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 218–19 (3d Cir. 2004) (Smith, J., 
concurring). 
 178. See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n.14 (1974) (noting that 
controlling burden of proof in suppression hearings is proof by preponderance of 
the evidence); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972) (holding that the 
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standard has the advantage of simplicity.  For a preponderance 
standard to be applied, the court must find that the area is more 
likely than not a high-crime area.179  However, as will be discussed 
below, the preponderance standard may not be the only standard 
available. 
The concurring opinion in Bonner specifically addressed the 
standard of proof and the district court’s choice of a preponderance 
of evidence standard.  As mentioned, Judge Smith proposed a more 
lenient standard, requiring the government to “prove that [the] 
officers effecting the stop had a reasonable articulable basis to believe that 
they were in a ‘high crime area.’”180  Judge Smith essentially created a 
reasonable suspicion test for high-crime areas (within the larger 
reasonable suspicion analysis for a Terry stop).181  As justification for 
the more lenient standard, Judge Smith reasoned that officers “may 
be informed by various objective observations, information from 
police reports, if such are available, and consideration of the modes 
or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers.”182  As a 
result, “an officer is in the position to know the routines and patterns 
of a geographic area, and whether it is prone to crime.”183  Judge 
Smith noted that “reviewing court[s] must give the appropriate 
weight to factual inferences drawn by local law enforcement officers,”184 
and rejected the notion that the government should have to provide 
hard data on crime statistics.185
Judge Smith’s standard would allow a high-crime area to be 
designated by the reasonable suspicion of officers thinking they were 
in a high-crime area.  In practical terms, this would mean that officers 
could explain why they believed the area to be a high-crime area, and 
Constitution requires the prosecution to prove that a confession was voluntary by a 
preponderance of the evidence);. 
 179. When presented with factual data or statistics to compare, such a comparison 
could be made with minimal difficulty. 
 180. Bonner, 363 F.3d at 218 (Smith, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 181. Presumably, this means that if officers have a reasonable suspicion that they 
are in a high-crime area, then they can use that reasonable suspicion to justify their 
reasonable suspicion of the actions of the suspect.  Upon analysis, one wonders 
whether this standard improves anything at all.  Certainly, it does not alter the status 
quo reality of having officers merely testify that they believed they were in a high-
crime area without any empirical, verifiable data.  It would also require a re-
evaluation of Bonner despite the district court’s findings because the officers clearly 
believed they were in a high-crime area. 
 182. Bonner, 363 F.3d at 219 (Smith, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 
(1996)). 
 185. See id. (“This knowledge [of crime data and statistics] may not be reflected on 
arrest records and log sheets, as arrests are not the only indicia of crime.”). 
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as long as their belief was based on some articulated factors, it would 
suffice for Fourth Amendment purposes.186
In dissent, Judge McKee argued for yet another mode of proof 
lying between the higher preponderance of the evidence standard 
and the lower reasonable articulable basis standard set forth by Judge 
Smith.  Judge McKee reasoned that “the inquiry must be the subjective 
belief of the arresting officer” which “must be objectively reasonable.”187  Judge 
McKee buttressed this objectively reasonable standard by noting that 
“[a]lthough proper deference must be afforded to the training, 
experience, and knowledge of police officers . . . the Constitution 
does not allow us to abdicate our responsibilities in favor of their 
judgments simply because we are operating within the comfortable 
confines of a courtroom.”188  Judge McKee rationalized the lesser 
standard because “reasonable suspicion can be established with 
information that is different in quantity or content than that required 
to establish probable cause”189 and because “reasonable suspicion can 
arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show 
probable cause.”190
Judge McKee’s standard would require a court to find a high-crime 
area based on the objectively reasonable, subjective belief of the 
officer.  Essentially, this would mean that an officer could testify to his 
subjective belief about an area with some minimal requirement that 
that belief be grounded in objective facts.  This raises the bar a bit 
from Judge Smith’s subjective approach, but still relies on the 
subjective beliefs of the officer. 
Importantly, however, it creates a rebuttable presumption of sorts 
that could be overcome by objective facts that show the officer’s 
belief was unreasonable.  Such a presumption leaves open the 
opportunity for a defendant to rebut the claim with crime data 
statistics or other data (as was successfully done in Bonner).  Judge 
McKee’s standard allows for the use of verifiable data, but does not 
require it in the government’s case.  It provides a compromise, 
recognizing that not all high crime areas can be determined by 
 186. The difficulty with this standard, as will be discussed infra, is that it is not 
much different from the existing reality and does little to clarify or refine the 
analysis.  It also shifts the determination of a legal fact—that an area was a high-crime 
area—into the hands of the officer and not the trial court. 
 187. Bonner, 363 F.3d at 222 n.5 (McKee, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 221 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)). 
 190. Id.  Judge McKee’s requirement that the officer’s subjective belief be 
objectively reasonable would allow a rebuttable presumption, which may, at least 
theoretically, be overcome by objective facts which show that the officer’s belief was 
unreasonable. 
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objective data, but also opens the door for use of that data when 
requested by either party. 
In parsing out the different standards addressed by the district and 
appellate courts in Bonner, there are three apparent options (in 
descending order of required proof):  (1) the preponderance of 
evidence standard (the Bonner district court standard); (2) the 
subjective belief that must be objectively reasonable (the McKee 
standard); and (3) the reasonable articulable basis standard (the 
Smith standard).  No other federal court has apparently attempted a 
similar analysis, but the question of what standard of proof should be 
applied is raised every day in reasonable suspicion determinations.  
As will be discussed in Part III, if an empirically driven analysis of 
high-crime area is to be undertaken, the existing undefined standards 
may not be sufficient. 
3.   Scope of designation 
Inherent in the definition of a high-crime area is a geographical 
and temporal limitation to that area.  What are the geographic 
boundaries?  Do they shift over time?  Can an area change from 
being a high-crime area to a non-high crime area over time, and how 
do we know when that has happened?  Courts have labeled certain 
streets, housing complexes, neighborhoods, intersections,191 and 
whole undefined areas with a high-crime gloss without ever giving 
precise information about the contours of the designation.192
Two cases out of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
demonstrate the problems of undefined geographical or temporal 
boundaries.  Unlike many larger jurisdictions, the District of 
Columbia offers a geographically discrete area of analysis.  Compared 
to the variations of potential “high crime” neighborhoods 
throughout Wardlow’s Illinois, for example, from cornfields to inner-
city Chicago, the District of Columbia presents a microcosm of 
differing socioeconomic areas in a rather limited space.  A particular 
“high-crime area” may well be confined to a few blocks within 
neighborhoods.  Further, with the rapid gentrification of certain 
neighborhoods, areas once designated high-crime areas may well, a 
decade later, be home to million-dollar condominiums and relatively 
 191. See, e.g., United States v. Caruthers, 458 F.3d 459, 468 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(agreeing that intersection in question was “high-crime area” because the crime 
defendant was stopped for frequently occurred there). 
 192. See infra notes 196–207 and accompanying text (criticizing a court’s 
designation of a street as a “high-crime area” when it is almost five miles long). 
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crime-free streets.193  It is in this limited geographic area, that the 
strength and weakness of the high-crime designation194 can be 
analyzed.195
First, in James v. United States,196 a District of Columbia Metropolitan 
Police Officer pulled over a car that had just swerved near the 
officer’s cruiser.197  The stop occurred on a street described by the 
testifying officer as “high crime, violent crime, it’s high narcotics, it’s 
high everything—burglaries, robberies.”198  When the officer 
approached the car, the driver looked at the officer and “kind of 
raised his body up a little bit, and then bent all the way down . . . and 
then he sat back up.”199  This led the officer to believe that the driver 
was “pulling a gun from his waist and putting it under the seat.”200  A 
search incident to the stop resulted in the recovery of a gun, and 
James was charged with a series of gun offenses.201  James moved to 
 193. See generally MAUREEN KENNEDY & PAUL LEONARD, THE BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTION, DEALING WITH NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE:  A PRIMER ON GENTRIFICATION 
AND POLICY CHOICES 54–59 (2001) (describing the partial gentrification of several 
Washington, D.C. neighborhoods), available at http://brookings.edu/reports/2001/ 
04metropolitanpolicy.aspx. 
 194. Perhaps because of the shaky neighborhood demarcations, pre-Wardlow cases 
in the District of Columbia viewed the “high-crime area” factor with a certain 
measure of skepticism.  The District of Columbia Court of Appeals required 
specificity in delineating what was and was not a “high-crime area” and when it was 
appropriate to consider such a designation.  For example, in the first case to address 
the weight to give a high crime area, the term had little impact.  In Kenion v. United 
States, the appellant—whom the officer believed had a prior robbery conviction—was 
stopped after he was seen conversing with two other men, in inclement weather, in 
an area described as “the heart and center for vice activity within [the third] district.”  
302 A.2d 723, 724 (D.C. 1973).  After the court of appeals dismissed the weather 
factor as being irrelevant, it concluded that “that fact [high crime area], without a 
great deal more, would not support an inference that appellant was engaged in 
criminal conduct.”  Id. at 725; see also In re D.J., 532 A.2d 138, 143 (D.C. 1987) 
(rejecting the notion that because the stop had taken place in “high narcotics area,” 
appellant’s conduct warranted heightened police attention, noting that “[t]housands 
of persons live and go about their legitimate business in areas which are denoted 
‘high narcotics areas’ by police,” and that “[i]nnocent activities do not become 
sinister by the mere fact that they take place in one of these areas”); Curtis v. United 
States, 349 A.2d 469, 472 (D.C. 1975) (“[W]e eschew the notion that the above facts 
assume added significance because they happen to have occurred in a high crime 
area.  This familiar talismanic litany, without a great deal more, cannot support an 
inference that appellant was engaged in criminal conduct.”). 
 195. As will be discussed in Part III, the District of Columbia crime patterns and 
crime statistics provide a workable metric to analyze the importance of getting the 
designation correct. 
 196. 829 A.2d 963 (D.C. 2003). 
 197. Id. at 964. 
 198. See id. (“[Officer] Green testified that he had been a police officer for five 
years and had worked in the Fourth District, where these events took place, for four 
of those years.”). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 964. 
 201. Id. at 964–65. 
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suppress the gun and lost at the trial level.202  On appeal, after noting 
that the “high-crime area” factor is “certainly relevant,” the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals stated that “[t]hat is especially true in this 
case, given that the area where appellant was stopped was not just a 
‘high crime’ area, but an area known specifically for the type of 
activity—i.e., gun possession—of which [the officer] suspected 
appellant.”203  The court appeared to give controlling emphasis to the 
“high-crime area” factor in upholding the trial court’s ruling. 
James is instructive for two reasons.  First, the area described as a 
“high everything” area is, in fact, one of the major north-south 
thoroughfares in Washington, D.C., Northwest.204  The language 
chosen by the officer, that “the Georgia Avenue corridor” was a high-
crime area means that a stretch of road almost five miles long was 
such an area.  In a city that is only about ten miles long north-south, 
this is an expansive and apparently unchallenged assertion.  In 
addition, the area in which the stop occurred was right by a major 
university and hospital complex.205  Second, the court inverted the 
nexus argument by allowing the officer’s scattershot suspicions to 
justify whatever was found.  Clearly, if it is a high “everything” area,206 
whatever is found would fall under the officer’s suspicions.  The 
testifying officer did not single out gun possession as what the area 
was known for, but rather that the area was known for all crimes.207  
One can imagine the court could have applied the same logic to 
drugs or other contraband if it had been found under the seat. 
As another example, Mayes v. United States208 highlights the difficulty 
of rebutting a claim that an area is no longer a “high-crime area.”209  
In Mayes, the officers had approached a stopped car in front of a 
“notorious crack house”210 which they believed matched the 
description of a car used in a shooting the previous night.211  At the 
 202. Id. at 964. 
 203. Id. at 968. 
 204. See, e.g., Nikita Stewart, Georgia Ave. Awakening, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2007, at 
A1 (referring to Georgia Avenue as Washington’s “longest commercial corridor” and 
the “heart and soul of the city”). 
 205. Whether there are spots along Georgia Avenue that are high crime areas may 
be accurate, but to claim that the entire road—half the city—is such an area paints 
with too broad a brush. 
 206. James, 829 A.2d at 864. 
 207. Id. 
 208. 653 A.2d 856 (D.C. 1995). 
 209. See infra notes 213–219 and accompanying text (showing how a court may 
designate an area as high-crime despite strong evidence to the contrary). 
 210. Mayes, 653 A.2d at 859. 
 211. Id. at 858; see also id. at 863–64 (asserting that officers’ reliance on report was 
insufficient to establish “articulable suspicion,” at least in part because—as the 
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motions hearing, the government offered evidence that the block on 
which the stop occurred was in a “high-crime area,” generally, and 
that the house in which the defendants were parked in front of was, 
in particular, a “notorious crack house.”212  This evidence was 
rebutted by a defense investigator, who testified that “the building 
was in fact a high-rent luxury apartment house with its own security 
fence,” which housed mostly “professional people.”213  The defense 
also submitted photographs of the luxury apartment house, a 
brochure about the building, and also testimony that “the premises 
and grounds were well maintained.”214  A defense investigator further 
testified that according to the building manager, there had been “no 
crime problems at the complex in the past four years” aside from 
“maybe a domestic situation.”215  While the trial court rejected the 
officer’s claim that the house was a “notorious crack house,” it still 
“credited the testimony that the general area was a high crime 
area.”216  In fact, the appellate court held that “the trial court was 
required, and so are we, to include in the [reasonable suspicion] 
calculus . . . the character of the neighborhood.”217
The issue of over-inclusive high-crime areas is not limited to 
Washington, D.C.  In many East Coast cities such as New York City, 
Boston, New Haven, and Philadelphia, economic change has 
reshaped former high-crime boundaries over the past decades.218 Yet, 
a Westlaw or Lexis search for the term in the relevant jurisdiction219 
will reveal historical judicial findings of high-crime areas fixed in the 
case law.  Litigants, thus, might be tempted to use these judicial 
findings in court even when the reality on the streets has changed. 
These questions of geographical and temporal relevance are 
manifest in the analysis of some courts trying to find a limit to the 
high-crime designation.  For example, the Ninth Circuit’s majority 
opinion in Montero-Camargo held that the data should identify 
government admitted— “[t]here was no evidence to speak of regarding the source’s 
basis of knowledge or reliability”). 
 212. Id. at 859. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 860. 
 217. Id. at 864.  The Court in Mayes rejected the trial court’s reasoning on other 
grounds. 
 218. See, e.g., Joanna Smith Rakoff, Is New York Losing Its Street Smarts?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 24, 2004, § 14, at 1 (crediting the drop in New York City crime rates, at least in 
part, to gentrification and the clean-up of the city), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/24/nyregion/24smar.html?scp=10&sq=gentrifica
tion+crime+&st=nyt. 
 219. See www.westlaw.com & www.lexis.com (keyword search “high crime area” /s 
“fourth amendment”).   
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“specific, circumscribed locations where particular crimes occur with 
unusual regularity”220 so as not to include “entire neighborhoods or 
communities in which members of minority groups regularly go 
about their daily business.”221  The Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit once even limited the designation to a particular intersection, 
so as not to create an overbroad area.222  Because the suspicion was 
tailored to “a specific intersection rather than an entire 
neighborhood,”223 the court found the area narrowly tailored enough 
to survive scrutiny.224
The First Circuit in Wright provides the clearest recognition of the 
concern of an overbroad designation.  Faced with an area that was 
not within Boston’s designated hotspots, but was apparently thought 
by the testifying officers to be a high-crime area, the First Circuit set 
out a three-part analysis to ensure that the designation of an area is 
closely correlated with the proof.225  In Wright, as discussed above, the 
court laid out three categories of relevant evidence for this 
determination:  (1) “the nexus between the type of crime most 
prevalent or common in the area and the type of crime suspected in 
the instant case”; (2) the “limited geographic boundaries of the ‘area’ 
or ‘neighborhood’ being evaluated”; and (3) the “temporal proximity 
between evidence of heightened criminal activity and the date of the 
stop or search at issue.”226  In setting out this framework, the First 
Circuit provides the first usable test for courts seeking to focus on the 
issues of cabining a particular geographic and temporal location.  It is 
also a useful starting point to create an objective, verifiable definition 
of a high-crime area.  This will be the subject of the next section. 
III.  EMPIRICAL AND VERIFIABLE EVIDENCE TO DETERMINE  
HIGH-CRIME AREAS 
The struggle to define and make meaningful a “high-crime area” 
designation has two root causes.  First, the Supreme Court left the 
question open in Wardlow, basing its holding on an assumed but 
 220. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 221. Id. 
 222. See United States v. Caruthers, 458 F.3d 459, 468 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that 
appellant conceded that particular intersection at issue was “high crime area where 
officers expect nightly calls regarding robberies or shots fired”). 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. United States v. Wright, 485 F.3d 45, 53–54 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 226. See id. (establishing a framework for objectively identifying specific area as 
“high crime” instead of relying solely on potentially self-serving police testimony). 
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undefined factual issue.227  Second, it is simply easier for district 
courts and prosecutors to rely on subjective opinions of police 
officers rather than to obtain hard, verifiable data.  This Part argues 
that the status quo is unacceptable for Fourth Amendment purposes, 
and that if the “high-crime area” designation is going to be used to 
alter constitutional protections, it must have basis in objective 
statistical fact. 
A.  The Constitutional Issue 
This Article proposes creating an affirmative burden of production 
for the government to prove that an area is a high-crime area.  In 
creating an additional burden, it is necessary to justify why such a 
burden is required and also why the existing legal practice is 
incomplete. 
To do so, one must understand the constitutional principles at play 
in the current Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion calculus.  
Briefly,228 altering Fourth Amendment protections for individuals in 
certain sections of a city has real consequences for individual 
liberty.229  The legal determination that men like Sam Wardlow have 
lesser Fourth Amendment protections simply because of the 
neighborhood in which they find themselves is fraught with 
concern.230  Even ignoring the economic, racial, and social 
inequalities involved, one must hope that police officers are at least 
correct that it is a high-crime area, and are not using their suspicions 
of the neighborhood as a proxy for impermissible hunches.  The line 
between constitutional “reasonable suspicion” and unconstitutional 
hunches is a difficult one to draw.231  Using neighborhoods as a 
means to blur that line must be carefully monitored. 
 227. See supra Part I.B (discussing how the Wardlow Court treated District 11 as a 
high-crime area without elaborating on the meaning of that phrase). 
 228. Again, there has been significant scholarly analysis of the liberty interests 
involved in the use of high-crime areas.  See supra notes 19–23 (surveying law review 
articles criticizing the high-crime area designation on racial, class, and First 
Amendment grounds). 
 229. The Fourth Amendment was enacted to protect individual liberty from 
overreaching government officials.  See, e.g., Ronner, supra note 19, at 397–98 
(explaining that agents of English parliament had an unrestricted right to search 
and seize, much to the dismay of the American colonists). 
 230. E.g., Seawell, supra note 21, at 1131 (arguing that the high-crime area 
designation leads to diminished expectations of privacy for some citizens and 
perpetuates the politics of identification). 
 231. Cf. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1142 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(Kozinski, J., concurring) (discussing the difficulty in applying totality of the 
circumstance test because the police officers discover whether their conduct was 
permissible only at trial). 
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In addition, because the current practice allows police officers to 
make assertions of the high-crime nature of the area without 
verifiable evidence, it allows the police to shape Fourth Amendment 
protections of its citizens.  Whether an area is a high-crime area is a 
legal (constitutional) fact.  It is an objective definition to be 
determined by the trial court, not the police officer.232  Yet, in relying 
on the testifying officer for the opinion about an area, courts are 
shifting the responsibility to police to make what is a legal conclusion.  
Officers acting in good faith about their experiences may be 
unintentionally shaping the constitutional protections of the citizens 
in the communities.  As Judge Kozinski recognized, we expect police 
officers to consider their beats a high-crime area because they are 
looking for—or responding to—reports of crime every day.233  
However, the fact that an individual officer sees crimes every day does 
not mean that these areas should necessarily be areas of lesser Fourth 
Amendment protection.  The Fourth Amendment is in part meant to 
act as a check on the interests of officers “engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”234
Thus, the additional burden of production to prove that an area is 
a high-crime area merely counteracts the weighty liberty interests at 
issue.  If the fact is going to change the scope of constitutional 
protections, then it had better be an accurate, provable, and court-
determined constitutional fact.  Interestingly, this is the position law 
enforcement took in the Wardlow case.  In its amicus brief before the 
Supreme Court, NAPO invited the Court to adopt an empirical test 
for high-crime areas.235
B.  The NAPO Amicus Brief 
Far from running away from objective requirements, the Wardlow 
NAPO amicus brief argued that an area with a reputation for high 
 232. See id. at 1138 (majority opinion) (emphasizing that designation of “high-
crime area” necessitates a “careful examination by the court”). 
 233. See id. at 1143 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (insisting that the testimony of police 
officers as to whether an area is “high crime” is not enough to designate it as such 
based solely on “unadorned personal experiences”). 
 234. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948) (“The point of the 
Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it 
denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men 
draw from evidence.  Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be 
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer 
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”). 
 235. See NAPO Amicus Brief, supra note 34, at 7–8 (suggesting that empirical data 
would rebut arguments that police artificially create “high-crime areas” by targeting 
neighborhoods with high concentrations of racial or ethnic minorities). 
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crime can be demonstrated by “verifiable and quantifiable data.”236  
The argument continued that “[s]ophisticated data collection, 
geographical computer and other mapping, and detailed 
geographical analysis systems have all become an essential part of 
crime prevention.”237  More specifically, the NAPO brief recognized 
that advancements in technology and computer mapping were 
providing geographical data useful in crime prevention.238  Reviewing 
this data in the context of Wardlow, NAPO stated: 
 Determining which locales or neighborhoods are high crime 
areas, and knowing what types of crimes are prevalent in those 
areas, results in a more efficient allocation of resources and thus 
more effective law enforcement, as was occurring in this case.  
Chicago Police District 11, where the Respondent fled from the 
police, is such a high crime area.  In 1997, District 11 had a higher 
overall total crime rate than 13 of the 25 police districts, roughly an 
equal crime rate to two of the districts, and a lower crime rate than 
9 of the districts.  When broken down further, this data reveals that 
in 1997, District 11 had the highest number of murders and 
robberies, and the second highest number of criminal sexual 
assaults and aggravated assaults, of all the police districts in 
Chicago.  This data clearly indicates that District 11 is a high crime 
area . . . .239
The NAPO brief concluded that this “quantification” of reports of 
crime prevents an arbitrary or unequal application of the high-crime 
area term.240
The NAPO brief is revealing for two contradictory reasons.  First, it 
shows the limitations of data analysis in the high-crime area 
context.241  Second, it shows that despite those limitations law 
enforcement has faith in its ability to determine through objective 
statistical data the existence of high-crime areas. 
 236. Id. at 7. 
 237. Id. 
 238. See id. at 20–21 (“The use of geographical factors in policing is the subject of 
extensive ongoing studies.  In conducting these studies, researchers rely on 
computer mapping as a fundamental tool when working with geographical data.  
Aided by advancements in technology, computer mapping, which can encompass the 
production of a simple pin map or the complex interactive mapping for detailed 
geographical analysis, has become an essential part of crime prevention in larger 
cities.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 239. Id. at 7. 
 240. See id. at 20 (“‘[H]igh crime areas’ are not determined in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner, but are so defined based on verifiable quantitative and qualitative 
factors, as well as strong anecdotal evidence.”). 
 241. See text accompanying notes 242–246 (suggesting that, relative to the other 
districts in Chicago, District 11 may not actually be a “high-crime area”). 
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As an initial matter, there are a few questions left open by the 
NAPO conclusion that District 11 is “clearly” a high-crime area.242  
First, District 11 appears to rank right in the middle of the districts in 
Chicago in terms of crime.243  Apparently, there are nine “higher” 
high-crime Districts, and two that tie with District 11.244  From the 
NAPO’s own analysis there are then at least twelve high-crime districts 
making half of Chicago’s districts “high-crime areas.”245  Further, the 
NAPO brief makes no distinction within districts, as if there were not 
particular areas or blocks that might exist as more particular problem 
locations.246  Finally, as is confounding in a case in which the 
proffered reasonable suspicion was that Mr. Wardlow was standing in 
a high-narcotics area, there are no drug statistics.247  Why a prevalence 
for robbery or murder is indicative of narcotics possession is not 
immediately obvious.  Thus, while the NAPO clearly seeks to rely on 
data for high-crime areas, the conclusions drawn from that data 
require more sustained scrutiny.248
However, while the conclusions of that data are debatable, law 
enforcement’s embrace of objective crime statistics puts into question 
why courts would rely on anything else in Fourth Amendment 
hearings.  After all, if police have the data available, why would it not 
be put into evidence as a matter of course in suppression hearings?  
The NAPO brief essentially invites the Supreme Court to adopt an 
objective standard for high-crime areas, because the police can 
provide the required information.249  This practical faith in data 
militates toward legal acceptance.  As demonstrated in the statistics 
provided in the amicus brief, the data already exists and is being used 
for staffing and resource allocation decisions in our communities.250  
It, therefore, also can be used to create accurate assessments in court.  
 242. NAPO Amicus Brief, supra note 34, at 7. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. See id. at 25 n.27 (disclosing that drug statistics were not included in the 
data). 
 248. However, even if the conclusion that District 11 is a “high-crime area” is 
contestable, the fact that it can be contested proves the larger point—namely, that 
objective statistics should be the determining fact in creating or defining high-crime 
areas. 
 249. See NAPO Amicus Brief, supra note 34, at 6–8 (arguing that crime statistics 
would allay fears that police officers are creating “high-crime areas” through 
subjective experience). 
 250. See id. at 21–22 (asserting that San Diego, CA; Dallas, TX; Baltimore, MD; and 
Tempe, AZ have all implemented various methods of crime mapping); see also infra 
note 251 (providing websites for other cities that have implemented methods of 
crime mapping). 
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Of course, as also detailed above, this data must be looked at with a 
critical eye before it is allowed to pass constitutional muster in Fourth 
Amendment hearings. 
Importantly, since Wardlow was decided in 2000, this ability to 
determine a high-crime area has only increased.  The prevalence of 
crime mapping software and crime pattern analysis has increased in 
sophistication and detail.  For example, in over two dozen 
jurisdictions there exist high-quality mapping technologies that are 
publicly available on the Internet.251  In addition, the Department of 
 251. See, e.g., Albuquerque Crime Statistics, http://www.cabq.gov/onlinesvcs/ 
crimestats/index.html (last visited June 10, 2008); Anchorage Police Department 
Density Map Archives, http://www.muni.org/apd1/densityarchives.cfm (last visited 
June 10, 2008); Atlanta Police Department Online Crime Mapping, 
http://www.atlantapd.org/index.asp?nav=CrimeMapping (last visited June 10, 2008); 
Austin Police Department Crime Report Viewer, http://coagis1.ci.austin.tx.us/ 
website/CrimeViewer/Run.htm (last visited June 10, 2008); Baltimore County 
Community Crime Profile Main Page, http://www.baltimorecountymd.gov/Agencies 
/infotech/geographic_information_systems/interactive_maps/ccpMain.html (last 
visited June 10, 2008); Baltimore Police Department, http://141.157.54.34/ 
bpdmaps/police.htm (last visited June 10, 2008); Boulder Crime Map, 
http://www.bouldercolorado.gov/files/Police/crime_map101207.swf (last visited 
June 10, 2008); Charlotte Community Crime Information System, 
http://maps.cmpdweb.org/cmpdnet/map.aspx (last visited June 10, 2008); Chicago 
Police Department Clear Map, http://gis.chicagopolice.org/ (last visited June 10, 
2008); City of Chico Crime Maps, http://www.chico.ca.us/Police/Crime_Analysis/ 
Crime_Maps.asp (last visited June 10, 2008); City of Lincoln Interactive Crime Map, 
http://www.lincoln.ne.gov/main/s_map.htm (last visited June 10, 2008); City of New 
Orleans Police Department, http://www.cityofno.com/Portals/Portal50/portal.aspx 
(last visited June 10, 2008); City of Reno Crime Reports, http://maps.cityofreno.net/ 
(last visited June 10, 2008); City of Sacramento Police Department Crime Mapping, 
http://gis.cityofsacramento.org/website/sacpd/ (last visited June 10, 2008); Denver 
Public Safety Reports, http://www.denvergov.org/DenverMaps/report.asp? 
rpt=csafe&cat=csafe (last visited June 10, 2008); Greenville County Incident Mapping 
System, http://www.gcgis.org/webmapso/ (last visited June 10, 2008); Indianapolis 
Law Enforcement Map Viewer, http://imaps.indygov.org/cvc/ (last visited June 10, 
2008); Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Crime Mapping Web Site, 
http://www.lvmpd.com/crimeviewcommunity/ (last visited June 10, 2008); 
Lexington Citizen’s Crime Watch, http://crimewatch.lfucg.com/ (last visited June 
10, 2008); Los Angeles Police Department Crime Maps, 
http://www.lapdonline.org/crimemap/ (last visited June 10, 2008); Memphis 
CrimeMapper, https://crimemapper.memphispolice.org/crimemapper/index.cfm 
(last visited June 10, 2008); Nashville Police Department Interactive Crime Maps, 
http://pdmap2.police.nashville.org/ (last visited June 10, 2008); Philadelphia 
CrimeBase Maps, http://www.cml.upenn.edu/crimebase/cbsMapRequest.asp (last 
visited June 10, 2008); Phoenix Police Department Monthly Crime Maps, 
http://phoenix.gov/POLICE/cristat_maps.html (last visited June 10, 2008); Pierce 
County Neighborhood Crime Homepage, http://www.piercecountycrimedata.org/ 
(last visited June 10, 2008); Portland Police Bureau Maps and Statistics, 
http://www.portlandonline.com/police/index.cfm?c=29795 (last visited June 10, 
2008); San Antonio Police Department Current Crime Data and Maps, 
http://www.sanantonio.gov/sapd/maps.asp?res=1344&ver=true#map (last visited 
June 10, 2008); San Francisco Police Department Crime Maps, 
http://www.sfgov.org/site/police_index.asp?id=23813 (last visited June 10, 2008); 
Scottsdale Crime Data Maps, http://eservices.scottsdaleaz.gov/dmc/crimes/ 
default.asp (last visited June 10, 2008); St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, 
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Justice has created a clearinghouse website and program to develop 
the technology.252  The growth of this technology will continue as will 
the feasibility and ease of creating a statistically verifiable high-crime 
area.  This development will both reaffirm law enforcement’s faith in 
the technology, but will also begin answering some of the questions 
left open by the courts about how to conceptualize a high-crime area. 
Adopting an empirical basis for a high-crime area designation is, 
however, only the beginning.  The real solution takes this starting 
point and meshes it with some of the considerations and conclusions 
of the federal appellate courts involving standards of proof, 
particularity, specificity, and the relevance of the nexus between this 
data and police actions on the street.  In this way, the data that law 
enforcement already relies on will become constitutionally relevant 
and useable in Fourth Amendment hearings. 
C.   A Proposal for an Objective, Quantifiable Approach to a High-Crime 
Area Designation 
A proposal for an objective, quantifiable approach to determine 
high-crime areas would necessarily have three component parts, each 
of which the government would have the burden of proving to the 
appropriate standard of proof.  First, the area in question would have 
to be demonstrated to be marked by a high incidence of 
particularized criminal activity in comparison to neighboring areas 
with objective and verifiable data.  Second, the area at issue would 
have to be narrowly tailored to a certain geographic location 
(perhaps including particular blocks, housing complexes, parks, or 
intersections) and would have to be current, limited to a recent 
temporal finding of recent crime activity.  Third, the nexus between 
the particularized criminal activity and the officer’s observations 
would have to be demonstrated.  The goal is to provide guidance to 
litigants and courts in Fourth Amendment suppression hearings 
when the issue of a “high-crime area” is raised. 
http://64.218.68.50/stlouis/newslmpd/viewer.htm (last visited June 10, 2008); St. 
Paul Crime Maps, http://www.stpaul.gov/index.asp?nid=690 (last visited June 10, 
2008); Toledo Police Department Crime Maps, http://www.toledopolice.com/ 
districtmaps.html (last visited June 10, 2008); Tulsa Police Department Map Central, 
http://www.tulsapolice.org/mapcentral.html (last visited June 10, 2008); West Des 
Moines Community Crime Mapping Web Site, http://crimeview.wdm-ia.com/CVC/ 
(last visited June 10, 2008); Wichita Police Department Crime Statistics, 
http://www.wichita.gov/CityOffices/Police/Stats/Crimes_Stats.htm (last visited June 
10, 2008). 
 252. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/maps/links.htm (last visited June 5, 2008). 
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1.   Crime statistics and other verifiable data 
In the high-crime area context, the central question will always be 
whether an area is disproportionately affected by criminal activity.  To 
avoid imprecision, this area will have to be statistically or objectively 
proven to have a higher incidence of crime than other relevant 
areas.253  Taking the invitation of NAPO,254 an objective statistical 
approach would require the government to produce available crime 
statistics about an area in the Fourth Amendment suppression 
hearing.  The trial court would thus have to evaluate this information 
as part of the reasonable suspicion calculus.  This additional step of 
review is in line with Terry, in which the Supreme Court noted that 
reasonable suspicion “becomes meaningful only when it is assured 
that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the 
laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a 
judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or 
seizure in light of the particular circumstances.”255
In practical terms, this means that government attorneys would be 
required to introduce some objective and verifiable evidence to 
support the claim that an area is a high-crime area.  This evidence 
could consist of certified arrest or conviction statistics from the area.  
In certain jurisdictions, the easiest mechanism would be to introduce 
evidence that the arrest took place in official “hot spots,”256 “drug free 
 253. See United States v. Diaz-Juarez, 299 F.3d 1138, 1145 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(Ferguson, J., dissenting) (stating that officer’s subjective viewpoint is not adequate 
support for “high crime” area designation:  “Agent Rodriguez testified that Terra del 
Sol Road ‘was located in a high-crime area, relying on his speculative observations.  
This testimony was a far cry from the ‘specific data’ required to support the assertion 
that the stop took place in a ‘high-crime’ area.” (citations omitted)). 
 254. See NAPO Amicus Brief, supra note 34, at 7 (allowing designation of high-
crime area to be based on “verifiable and quantifiable data”). 
 255. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).  This insight from Terry comes from 
Professor Goldman’s 2001 article on Wardlow.  See Goldman, supra note 23, at 572 
(2001) (asserting that an officer’s insights and perspectives should not end the 
inquiry in defining “reasonable suspicion” in a “high crime” area). 
 256. A hot spot is defined as “an area that has a greater than average number of 
criminal or disorder events, or an area where people have a higher than average risk 
of victimization.”  JOHN ECK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MAPPING CRIME:  
UNDERSTANDING HOT SPOTS 2 (2005), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/209393.pdf; see id. (“Areas of concentrated crime 
are often referred to as hot spots.  Researchers and police use the term in many 
different ways.  Some refer to hot spot addresses, others refer to hot spot blocks, and 
others examine clusters of blocks.”) (citations omitted); see also Anselin et al., supra 
note 25, at 222–23 (“A crime hot spot is a location, or small area with an identifiable 
boundary, with a concentration of criminal incidents.  These chronic crime places 
where crime is concentrated at high rates over extended periods of time may be 
analogous to the small percentage of chronic offenders who are responsible for a 
large percentage of crime.”). 
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zones,”257 or other recognized areas of concern.258  Other means of 
proof might be the introduction of maps of such designated areas in 
a locality.  Experts could even be called to testify on the subject.  Even 
less formalized proof might be allowed, consisting of police logs, 
cataloged citizen complaints, or other official findings about a 
particular area.  Officers might even be able to testify about their own 
arrests in locations as long as those arrests could be verified by proper 
documentation (including police records or arrest reports).  The key 
modification would be a requirement of empirical data or 
documentation that could be verified and compared by the trial 
court. 
Importantly, the prosecutor would be required to demonstrate that 
the introduced statistics were higher than those of other neighboring 
areas, and that the difference was significant for constitutional 
purposes.  To be relevant, there would have to be a baseline figure 
for comparison.  To challenge the government evidence, defense 
lawyers would be entitled to introduce contrary statistics, experts, 
records, or comparisons. 
The difficult question remaining for courts to decide will be how 
“high” a high-crime area must be to shift the Fourth Amendment 
balance.  Whether courts would be satisfied with a middle-of-the-
range determination, as with Wardlow’s District 11, remains to be 
seen.  It is a question currently unexamined because of the paucity of 
empirical information and sustained analysis.  However, over time an 
established baseline of understanding will begin to develop about the 
definition of a high-crime area in particular localities. 
At a minimum, it would seem that for constitutional standards to 
be shifted, the claim of a high-crime area must mean something 
significant.  To alter fundamental Fourth Amendment protections, it 
would seem necessary that the area really be qualitatively different.  
Designated high-crime areas in the top ten or twenty percent may 
make the cut, but one would question whether the middle-ground 
 257. See Peter M. Flanagan, Trespass Zoning:  Ensuring Neighborhoods a Safer Future by 
Excluding Those with a Criminal Past, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 327, 331–32 (2003) 
(comparing drug exclusion zones enacted in Portland, Oregon and Cincinnati, 
Ohio); see id. at 334 (praising the effectiveness of drug-fee zones in reducing crime). 
 258. David M. Kennedy, Pulling Levers:  Chronic Offenders, High Crime Settings, and a 
Theory of Prevention, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 449, 459 (1997) (“[M]uch crime—violent, 
drug, property and domestic—is concentrated in certain neighborhoods, particularly 
poor minority neighborhoods.  More recently, attention has turned to ‘hot spots’ 
even within such neighborhoods.  In Minneapolis, in 1986, only 3% of the city’s 
street addresses produced 50% of calls for police service.  In Boston, gang turf 
representing less than 4% of the city accounted for more than 12% of the city’s 
armed robberies and roughly a quarter of youth homicides, gun assaults, weapons 
offenses, drug offenses, and calls for service regarding ‘shots fired.’”). 
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determinations should pass muster.259  In some way, the term itself 
may have to be redefined with distinctions made between “high,” 
“higher,” and “highest” crime designations. 
This Article cannot resolve what is, in essence, the ultimate 
question for courts considering the high-crime designation in 
particular locations.  The definitional questions addressed here and 
in the following sections suggest the tools for analysis, but not a 
universal answer.  However, the only way courts will be able to adopt 
an accurate and rigorous approach to localized high-crime areas is to 
begin demanding this type of objective and empirical evidence. 
2.   Geography and timing 
To create a workable “high-crime area,” the statistics or data must 
relate to a specific and particularized geographic area with set 
boundaries.260  In addition, the area must be a current high-crime 
area, not necessarily a historic high-crime area.261  Thus, an empirical, 
verifiable high-crime definition would also have to require a 
geographic and temporal limitation. 
In practical terms this will likely be determined by how the crime 
statistics are collected in a particular jurisdiction.  For example, in 
Chicago during the Wardlow case, the city was broken up into police 
districts.262  As detailed in the NAPO amicus brief, the police were 
confident enough in their collection strategy to propose a district-
wide categorization to the Supreme Court.263  However, it is likely that 
the Chicago police had an even better understanding of the crime 
 259. One of the consequences of adopting a preponderance of evidence standard 
(discussed later) may be to create a binary determination of what is a high-crime 
area.  For example, if an area is in the 51% category, does that mean it is really a 
“high-crime area” for constitutional purposes?  While it is higher than other areas, it 
would seem that designating half an area (city, county, or even state) a high-crime 
area will not survive sustained analysis.  It would likely be struck down as overbroad 
and overinclusive for any practical use. 
 260. See United States v. Caruthers, 458 F.3d 459, 468 (6th Cir. 2006) (recognizing 
that an overly large or vague demarcation of a high-crime area might lead to 
impermissible profiling, but because the “high crime” area in question was “a specific 
intersection rather than an entire neighborhood[,]” the Court’s concerns were 
alleviated). 
 261. See Stewart, supra note 204 (noting the revitalization efforts aimed at the 
Georgia Avenue corridor in Washington, D.C.). 
 262. See NAPO Amicus Brief, supra note 34, at 24 (“Chicago has 25 police 
districts.”)  The brief details how the district crime data show that District 11 (the 
district in question in Wardlow) had a statistically higher crime rate than more than 
half of the police districts in Chicago. 
 263. See id. at 7–8 (comparing data from District 11 with twenty-five police crime 
districts in Chicago and concluding that, as a whole, District 11 is a high-crime area).  
NAPO preemptively rejects any assertion that areas with large minority populations 
are disproportionately targeted, because Chicago’s police districting system allows for 
quantifiable crime reports.  Id. at 8. 
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patterns in the city than mere district summaries.264  In Washington, 
D.C., the Metropolitan Police Department offers a publicly accessible 
website, in which one can find the number of crimes for a particular 
block or intersection for the past two calendar years.265  Thus, while 
the Metropolitan Police Department also has a district-wide crime 
mapping system, because more tailored street-by-street mapping 
exists, it would make little sense to rely on an overbroad district-wide 
categorization.  Instead, in the District of Columbia, litigants should 
be able to determine to a close degree of certainty the type and 
frequency of a particular crime during a particular timeframe.266  
Looking at how various jurisdictions already catalogue their reports 
of crime is the first step in determining the appropriate geographic 
limitation. 
How a jurisdiction maps crimes for its own internal purposes, 
however, may not be the optimal designation for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment.  Crime does not necessarily remain localized to 
a particular district.267  The effects of a particular block may well spill 
over to other blocks or cross district lines.268  In addition, crime may 
be centered on various buildings, stores, or residential complexes 
that are located on those blocks.269  Sometimes, there will be a single 
source point for criminal activity, be it a parking lot, alley, or park.270  
 264. In fact, if one views the City of Chicago’s crime mapping database, one can 
see a very sophisticated crime pattern analysis.  See Chicago Police Department, Clear 
Map Crime Incidents, http://gis.chicagopolice.org/CLEARMap/startPage.htm (last 
visited June 10, 2008) (allowing users to retrieve results using searches based on a 
variety of parameters, such as date range or specific geographic range like address, 
beat, or school).  The results can be as specific as within 1/8th of a mile of a 
particular address. 
 265. See District of Columbia, Metropolitan Police Department, 
http://crimemap.dc.gov/presentation/query.asp (last visited June 10, 2008) 
(allowing the user to search for crime by specific address and also within 500, 1000, 
or 1500 feet of that location).  For example, between January 1, 2008, and April 1, 
2008, there were twenty-two thefts within 1500 feet of the D.C. Superior Court at 500 
Indiana Avenue NW.  This type of crime is up 214% from the same date range last 
year, when there were seven thefts within a 1500-foot radius of the courthouse. 
 266. Other jurisdictions, as evidenced by the City of Chicago’s website, have the 
same capabilities.  See supra note 251 (providing a list of websites maintained by cities 
that track and map crime). 
 267. See Anselin et al., supra note 25, at 223 (“Fixed boundaries (e.g., census tracts, 
police precincts, or uniform grid cells) have the advantage of giving rise to the 
space/time series data commonly used for crime reporting and spatial modeling.  
Their disadvantage is that hot spots may cross the fixed boundaries or vary in size.”). 
 268. See id. (noting that an alternative method of defining hot spot boundaries 
through ad hoc clustering can “yield[] sizes and shapes tuned specifically to 
individual hot spots”). 
 269. See id. at 223–24 (providing examples of hot spots in various cities that limit 
boundaries to “no more than one linear block of a street” or to specific times of day). 
 270. In addition, it must be recognized that not all crime is reported or cataloged 
even in the most sophisticated crime mapping program.  See MARKOVIC & STONE, 
supra note 28, at 2 (“No crime map reflects all crime.  In order to appear on a map, a 
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Certain neighborhoods may have safe areas and less safe areas.  Thus, 
the ability to view crime patterns within a larger geographic 
understanding is important, and may mean that an alternative 
method of defining a high-crime area is necessary.  The question is 
still how to cabin those “areas” so that they are useable in court and 
meaningful for Fourth Amendment purposes.271
The majority of jurisdictions will likely adopt a high-crime area 
definition using existing metrics including districts or sub-districts 
(usually police patrol areas) or particular streets.272  However, another 
solution would be to create an accepted geographic radius as a unit 
of measure for a high-crime area.  For example, a 500-foot, 1000-foot, 
or 1500-foot radius of the area around the arrest location could be 
considered a fair geographic measure of an area.  In the District of 
Columbia, using the public crime mapping technology, one can view 
a 500-foot, 1000-foot, or 1500-foot radius of the area in which the 
crime occurs.273  The mapping technology creates a shaded circular 
crime must be reported, have a geographic reference, and be of sufficient priority to 
be put on a map. . . . Among crimes that are reported to police, some do not have 
geographic references.  Financial fraud, extortion, and many forms of conspiracy do 
not occur at fixed locations and are therefore rarely mapped. . . . Even for crimes 
that occur at specific locations, such as armed robbery and sexual assault, police 
agencies do not always record the location with enough detail to allow the incident 
to be mapped.  This is especially common when someone reports a crime at a police 
station days after the event. . . . Even some jurisdictions with sophisticated crime 
mapping programs choose not to map some forms of domestic violence, crimes 
among juveniles, threats, defacing public property, and other criminal offenses.”). 
 271. The study of crime mapping technology and specifically hot spots is 
incredibly complex and beyond the scope of this Article.  The analysis can include 
differentiating between hot spot places (specific addresses, corners, or other physical 
places, robberies at ATMs or stores, drug dealing locations), hot spot streets 
(corridors, avenues, alleys that encourage prostitution, robberies or street drug 
dealing), hot spot areas (neighborhoods, multi-block concentrations that recognize 
residential burglaries or gang activity), and repeat victim spots (domestic violence 
cases).  See ECK ET AL., supra note 256, at 5 (noting that the identification of hot spots 
requires multiple techniques).  In addition, based on the type of crime, there might 
be different types of crime maps, including, for example, “dot maps” (for specific 
addresses), “line maps” (for streets), and ellipse, choropleth, and isoline maps (for 
broader areas).  See id. at 9–10 (comparing different hot spot theories). 
 272. See Anselin et al., supra note 25, at 223 (“Perhaps the easiest means of 
identifying hot spots is to partition a jurisdiction into a fixed set of boundaries (e.g., 
square grid cells, census block groups, or some other boundary set) and to develop a 
set of rules (a ‘rule base’) using threshold values.”). 
 273. The technology allows a user to adjust the search from 100 feet to 1500 feet 
from the location of the arrest.  This is a common phenomenon with crime mapping 
technology.  See MARKOVIC & STONE, supra note 28, at 3 (“In general, crime mapping 
projects rely on digital base maps created by government departments other than the 
police. . . . The base maps themselves vary in the level of detail they provide.  For 
example, many cities contain informal settlements without planned streets or 
services, and addresses in these areas may not have standard names or numbers.  The 
level of detail is important not only for display and analysis, but also for locating 
crime incidents and contextual features on maps in the first place, a process known 
as ‘geocoding.’  The geocoding process translates standard street address 
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area around an arrest location with more detailed mapping of the 
cross streets, houses, and other things in the area.274  This localized 
crime mapping technology may provide a better definition of a “high-
crime area” than using predefined neighborhood labels or entire 
police districts.275  Depending on the technology, this type of defined 
radius could be adopted in particular locations.  Thus, as a practical 
matter in a Fourth Amendment hearing, an officer would testify that 
he made an arrest at a particular location.  Then, a review of a 1000-
foot radius of that location could be conducted to determine all of 
the similar crimes over the past few months.  The result would be an 
accurate and verifiable number of crimes to compare with the entire 
jurisdiction’s crime pattern. 
The solution of a limited geographic area for a high-crime area 
also solves the temporal issue of relying on historic high-crime areas 
that no longer have the same incidence of crime.276  Again, by using 
modern mapping technology such as the one provided in the District 
of Columbia, one can search for crime patterns within the relevant 
time period.  Usually, a one- to three-month time period before the 
arrest at issue will be the relevant time frame.  Even if one extends 
that period to sixth months or a year, the parties will at least have a 
baseline idea of the amount of crime in a particular area.  One of the 
dangers of not restricting the inquiry to a particular time period is 
that certain areas will never escape the perception being a high-crime 
area.  Neighborhoods should be judged on current facts rather than 
a negative reputation or outdated history.277
information into latitude and longitude coordinates so that the locations of criminal 
incidents and contextual features such as parks and schools, boundaries of police 
and neighborhood watch districts, and census tracts can be displayed on the maps.”). 
 274. See id. at 2–3 (“Crime maps are most useful when they display a variety of 
geographical features that place crime data in context. . . . Some of these contextual 
elements can be classified as crime generators or crime suppressors.  Crime 
generators may include shops with liquor licenses, shopping malls, gambling 
establishments, concert venues, and the like.  Crime suppressors may include police 
stations, neighborhood watch areas, or designated safety corridors.”). 
 275. Of course, this radius would be unnecessary if police departments created 
already predetermined maps of hot spot or high drug activity with specific streets 
included. 
 276. See D.R. v. State, 941 So. 2d 536, 537 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that 
because “[t]he evidence adduced established only that the officer’s knowledge of the 
area was not current and that an undetermined number of narcotics arrests took 
place there at some unknown time[,]” the government’s evidence of a high crime 
area was insufficient); see also id. at 538 (“The burden of proof rests with the State, 
and the officer’s testimony suggests strongly that more detailed evidence about the 
current status of the neighborhood could have been provided.  As it was, however, 
the officer’s out-of-date conclusion, unreinforced by specific, contemporary 
information, was legally insufficient to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 277. See Stewart, supra note 204 (noting the “renaissance” of an area of 
Washington, D.C. “tattered by time, drugs, and neglect”). 
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Refining the definition of a high-crime area to a defined 
geographic and temporal area yields two main advantages for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.  In terms of geography, it provides a measure 
of precision in creating a defined and limited area.  This precision 
prevents overbroad analysis of areas, limiting “high-crime areas” to 
only those areas that deserve the label.  Second, in requiring current, 
updated high-crime designations it provides the ability for courts to 
make an accurate determination of the conditions on the ground.  
Deciding cases based on out-of-date determinations or incorrect 
information is not relevant and should not be the basis for Fourth 
Amendment decisions when better information exists. 
3.   Nexus 
The fact that a designated area statistically might be a high-crime 
area does not end the analysis.  That an area may have a heightened 
number of crimes means little if this information is either not known 
by the police officer or not related to the observation of that officer.  
Central to the Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion analysis is 
the nexus between knowledge about an area and the observations of 
an individual officer on the street. 
One of the least discussed issues in the high-crime area debate is 
relevance.278  The only reason a high-crime area is relevant is that it 
makes an officer’s “suspicion” about otherwise innocent conduct in 
that area more reasonable.279  If the area is a high-crime area known 
for burglaries, the sight of a man loitering with a bag over his 
shoulder may mean something different than if the area is known as a 
bus stop or transit point.  However, if that area is known for 
burglaries, the fact that an officer sees a hand-to-hand transfer of an 
object for money (consistent with a drug deal) should add little to his 
suspicion in that neighborhood.  While he may be in a “high-crime 
area,” there is no relevant connection between the character of the 
neighborhood and what he observed.  A broad brush 
characterization cannot withstand this type of specific and 
particularized scrutiny.280
 278. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision To Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 
214, 222 n.42 (1983) (“[U]nless there is some identity between the prevalent crime 
and the crime suspected, a ‘crime-prone’ neighborhood does not increase the 
probability that a particular crime is being committed.”). 
 279. See United States v. Caruthers, 458 F.3d 459, 468 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he 
crimes that frequently occur in the area are specific and related to the reason for 
which Caruthers was stopped.  Thus, we are satisfied that we have not too easily 
permitted the consideration of this factor.”). 
 280. See United States v. Edmonds, 240 F.3d 55, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he 
government established not just that Livingston Road suffers from general, 
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In addition, the information about the area cannot simply be 
collected at police headquarters and introduced at a suppression 
hearing; it must be known before the officer makes his observation.  
If an officer does not know the information before making the 
observation, that information would be irrelevant to the 
reasonableness of the officer’s reasonable suspicion.281  For the 
information about the neighborhood to have constitutional weight, 
the officer would have to be educated on it and then base his or her 
actions on that information. 
The Wardlow case itself demonstrates the forgotten relevance of 
nexus.  According to the NAPO argument, the area in question was 
known for a statistically high incidence of serious crimes—murder, 
robbery, aggravated assault.282  There was no statistical evidence of 
drug crimes, but the evidence introduced (through non-statistical 
testimony) was that the area was known for “high narcotics traffic.”283  
The officers were on patrol as part of their narcotics enforcement 
duties and observed Sam Wardlow standing with a white bag on the 
street.284  Would a trained officer seeing a man with an opaque bag 
think this was consistent with criminal activity of murder, robbery, 
assault, or even drug dealing?  Likely, the answer is no.  So even in 
the foundational case of Wardlow, we are left with arguably irrelevant 
crime statistics creating a high-crime area and making a 
constitutional difference for Fourth Amendment purposes.  Properly 
analyzed, Wardlow would likely be decided differently if the high-
crime nexus were taken seriously.  Even assuming that the officers on 
patrol reasonably suspect the area in question was objectively a high 
narcotics area, here, knowing that fact adds little to the 
reasonableness of whether officers should know that criminal activity 
was afoot based on the observation of flight while holding a white 
bag. 
undifferentiated ‘crime,’ but that it is home to the precise type of infractions—drug 
and firearm offenses—that [Officer] Feirson suspected [Defendant] Edmonds of 
committing.”). 
 281. This is simply a matter of logic.  The legal relevance of the information is 
how it affects the officer’s judgment on the street.  If he did not know anything about 
the area, it could not affect his judgment.  Further, this information should not only 
be relevant for the stop, but also the search.  The information an officer has about 
the particular crime patterns should also allow certain freedom and/or restraint in 
terms of the scope of the search under the Fourth Amendment. 
 282. See NAPO Amicus Brief, supra note 34, at 7 (“District 11 [the district in 
question] had the highest number of murders and robberies, and the second highest 
number of criminal sexual assaults and aggravated assaults, of all the police districts 
in Chicago.”). 
 283. People v. Wardlow (Wardlow I), 678 N.E.2d 65, 66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997), aff’d, 
701 N.E.2d 484 (Ill. 1998), rev’d, 528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
 284. Id. 
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Of course, in some cases the expectation of the officers will be 
central to the suspicion.  In a high-drug area, the incidence of hand-
to-hand transactions may well be sufficient to create reasonable 
suspicion for a Terry stop.285  Such direct nexus between the 
expectation about the area and the officer’s observation should not 
be overlooked by reviewing courts.  Nexus is central to the relevance 
of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis and the inclusion 
of objective, verifiable statistics or information makes this relevance 
analysis possible. 
D.  Standard of Proof 
The final issue in creating an objective and verifiable standard for 
high-crime areas is to decide on a standard of proof.  It is, 
unexpectedly, a complex and unsettled question, as courts have not 
analyzed the issue in any great detail. 
Under any standard, the government would have the burden of 
justifying an infringement of an individual’s Fourth Amendment’s 
rights.  It must be the government’s burden to prove that there is an 
“objective evidentiary justification” for the infringement of that 
expectation of privacy.286  Further, for an empirical statistical 
approach to have any meaning, the standard of proof must be clear. 
Two possible solutions to the standard of proof are proposed here.  
One solution would be a preponderance of evidence standard.  While 
not required under existing law, the standard would have the 
advantage of clarity.  A trial court could simply determine whether 
there is a significantly higher incidence of relevant crime in the 
designated area based on available evidence.287  Like many points of 
 285. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 3.6(g), at 366 (4th ed. 2004) 
(“The courts have rather consistently concluded that ‘the incidence of a high crime 
rate is a relevant circumstance to be considered in determining the existence of 
probable cause,’ and properly so. . . . [I]f an officer observes a street corner 
exchange of some substance for money, such an event takes on a special meaning if 
it happens in a part of the community where drug traffic is intensive.”). 
 286. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968). 
 287. In certain civil cases involving the existence of high crime areas, courts have 
been willing to demand crime data to determine the foreseeability of criminal 
incidents and thus the viability of negligence claims.  See, e.g., Oliver v. Abdul Prod. 
II, Inc., No. 03-2240, 2005 WL 3478399, at *2–3 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2005) (stating that 
“general crime statistics” are not sufficient to prove that harm is foreseeable); District 
of Columbia v. Doe, 524 A.2d 30, 33–34 (D.C. 1987) (accepting evidence of previous 
violent crimes in school and surrounding area sufficient to prove notice of harm); 
Asbell v. BP Exploration & Oil, Inc., 497 S.E.2d 260, 264 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) 
(rejecting security expert’s testimony because he lacked statistical data to back up 
claim that location in question was in high crime area); Tex. Real Estate Holdings, 
Inc. v. Quach, 95 S.W.3d 395, 398–99 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (relying on statistics from 
census tract rather than those from police beat because tract more narrowly and 
accurately reflected criminal activity of specific location of crime).  Courts have 
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disputed evidence, the trial court would decide, weighing the 
proffered evidence. 
However, as demonstrated in the Bonner debate, the 
preponderance of evidence standard may not neatly fit a Fourth 
Amendment reasonable suspicion calculus.  Specifically, the language 
from Wardlow states that reasonable suspicion “requires considerably 
less” than the preponderance of evidence.288  Thus, the ultimate legal 
standard is less than a preponderance of evidence, making it 
somewhat counter-intuitive that the component facts of the 
reasonable suspicion totality would have to be proven to a higher 
standard.  In other words, while the legal standard for the trial court 
may be a lower bar of “reasonable suspicion,” each of the facts 
supporting that reasonable suspicion might have to be proved to a 
higher preponderance of evidence standard. 
As an example, imagine a scenario in which, at a Fourth 
Amendment suppression hearing, the government introduced 
evidence to support the claim that the suspect “fled” at the sight of 
police.  The testimony to support this claim was that the suspect, a 
young man, observed the presence of police and walked rapidly into 
a building while tucking an unknown object quickly into his bag.  A 
trial court deciding how to evaluate whether there was evidence of 
flight would have to evaluate the facts to some legal standard.  
Walking rapidly is a fact.  Whether the suspect walked rapidly enough 
to be considered flight from officers would be a fact with legal 
considerations.  It would not be unreasonable for a trial court to use 
a preponderance standard as a default standard to determine if, in 
fact, this fact had been established.  A judge could say, “Yes, the 
young man walked rapidly away from officers, I can find that to a 
preponderance standard.”  However, without more, this fact may not 
be sufficient for the legal conclusion that the young man fled at the 
sight of police.  It would, however, be one fact included in the totality 
of circumstances analysis necessary for reasonable suspicion. 
Similarly, with high-crime areas, the judge could say, 
cautioned that findings of the foreseeability of crime in a specific area should be 
based on well-defined reports of crime statistics.  See Timberwalk Apartments, 
Partners, Inc. v. Cain, 972 S.W.2d 749, 757 (Tex. 1998) (noting that “[s]tatistics 
regarding large or undefined geographic areas do not by themselves make crime 
foreseeable at a specific location.”). 
 288. See Illinois v. Wardlow (Wardlow III), 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (“While 
‘reasonable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause and 
requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth 
Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification . . . .”). 
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 I find that the area in which the young man walked is a known 
high drug area.  The prosecution has shown that this 
neighborhood has one of the highest incidences of drug crime in 
the city.  The prosecution has provided official arrest statistics that 
demonstrate that this neighborhood is a recognized problem area 
for drugs and guns, compared to other areas in the city.  I can find 
by a preponderance that the area is a high crime area, and will 
factor that into my Fourth Amendment calculus. 
The two facts:  that the young man walked rapidly away from police 
officers, and that the area is a high-crime area are, thus proved to a 
higher standard than the ultimate reasonable suspicion legal analysis, 
without harm done to the legal standard.  The court is still making 
the ultimate legal conclusion based on existing constitutional 
standards.  The court’s conclusion regarding the high-crime area, 
however, may not end the analysis.  If, for example, the young man 
were a student at a law school in a high-crime area, the building were 
a library, and the object a cell phone, the court could well balance 
the facts to come to a different legal conclusion about reasonable 
suspicion.  Yet, in terms of the standard of proof, there is little reason 
to lower the standard below a preponderance of evidence for each of 
the individual facts under consideration by the trial court. 
However, this type of preponderance analysis was exactly what the 
Third Circuit discussed and apparently rejected in Bonner.289  
Recognizing the debate in Bonner, this Article would also offer 
another alternative standard of proof based in part on Judge McKee’s 
dissent.  It would be a lesser standard than a preponderance of 
evidence, but still have sufficient analytical force to protect individual 
liberties.  Instead of positing the reviewing standard as a “subjective 
belief of the arresting officer” that “must be objectively reasonable,”290 
this Article would require a subjective belief that is objectively 
reasonable, and objectively accurate.  The reviewing court would have to 
determine:  (1) if the police officer had a subjective belief that the 
area was a high-crime area; (2) that this belief was objectively 
 289. United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 222 n.5 (McKee, J., dissenting).  In 
part, this was because Judge Smith chose to rely on the “factual inferences” of the 
officer to help shape the understanding of the neighborhood.  See id. at 219 (Smith, 
J., concurring) (noting that a law enforcement officer might have background 
knowledge about criminal activity of area not reflected by empirical data such as 
arrest records).  The difference between an officer relying on a factual inference 
about a neighborhood and a court reviewing the objective facts about a 
neighborhood is a subtle, but critical shift.  Relying on police officers to provide 
factual inferences about a neighborhood is, in essence, to allow officers and not the 
court to shape the conclusion of whether an area is, in fact, a high crime area.  See 
supra note 234. 
 290. Id. at 222 n.5 (McKee, J., dissenting). 
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reasonable, and (3) that this assessment about the neighborhood was, 
in fact, accurate based on existing data.291
The third, added step would be to see if the officer’s subjective 
belief based on objective information correlates with the actual 
objective data available about the area.  Courts would review the 
government’s proffer of statistics or other data about the area in light 
of the officer’s subjective assessment of the area.  The defense would 
also be able to challenge those facts with their own contrary objective 
data if it existed.  If the court determined that there existed accurate 
and verified data about a defined high-crime area and that the officer 
correctly relied on accurate data, then the objective standard would 
be met.  The difference between this and the preponderance of 
evidence standard is that under this lesser standard the court would 
not have to determine as a fifty-one percent fact that the area was a 
high-crime area, only that the officer relied on objectively accurate 
information about the area.  It still would be the court, not the 
officer, making the factual determination.292
V.  CONCLUSION:  THE BENEFITS OF THE EMPIRICAL APPROACH TO 
HIGH-CRIME AREAS 
To summarize, a requirement of verifiable and quantitative high 
crime evidence would require several steps.  First, in a Fourth 
 291. In practical terms, this proposed standard would mean that the court would 
have to be satisfied not only that the arresting officer knew through some objective 
means that the area was a high crime area, but that the officer was correct in that 
belief.  Thus, the first step would be to look at what the officer knew.  The officer’s 
subjective knowledge could be shown through incident reports, prior arrest logs, or 
other forms of proof short of official statistics.  The second step would be to see if 
this subjective belief was objectively reasonable.  Most times the officer’s subjective 
belief will be based on some set of collected objective facts, including reports, 
briefings, or experience about the area.  An officer whose subjective belief was not 
based on any prior information or experience could not survive this second step.  
However, in most cases there is some objective basis for the subjective belief, even if 
it cannot be quantified or verified (or even if it is actually incorrect).  As discussed 
above, it is this third step of analyzing and comparing the objective data that ensures 
that the suspicion about a neighborhood is anchored in accurate and verified 
information. 
 292. The difference between this and the Bonner standard of Judge McKee is 
demonstrated in the following example:  An officer could testify that a particular 
block is known to be a high-drug area (step one).  He could explain that this 
subjective belief is based on official arrest reports from the area that show three 
arrests a month for the past six months.  The officer’s belief thus would be based on 
objective facts (step two).  However, if it could shown that there were one hundred 
other blocks with three arrests a week, or three arrests a day, it could be shown that, in 
fact, this was not a high drug block compared to other places in the city.  Further, if 
the defense could show that there were over ten designated hot spots and that they 
were not near the block at issue, it would undermine the high-crime area claim.  
Only by requiring the third step of review can there be any confidence that certain 
areas are, in fact, higher crime areas. 
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Amendment suppression hearing, the government must introduce 
objective, verifiable data about the level of crime in a particular area, 
as compared to other comparable areas in the region.  This evidence 
can be admitted through crime statistics, crime maps, designated hot-
spot or red-zone maps, verifiable arrest data, crime report data, 
expert testimony, or other official police information.  The statistical 
evidence must be current to the time of the arrest.  The statistical 
data must relate to a particular and circumscribed area.  This area 
must be limited and described using existing police districts, 
established neighborhood demarcations, particular intersections or 
streets, or previously designated areas or a specified radius.  For 
example, in hot spot areas, having a north, south, east, and west 
boundary would be required.  For a radius, a specified number of feet 
would be appropriate.  Second, this particularized knowledge about 
an area must be demonstrated to be known to the officer before 
making the arrest, so as to establish the nexus between the relevance 
of the high-crime area and the reasonable suspicions of the officer.  
Third, the trial court would have to make a factual finding about 
whether the area was objectively a high-crime area.  Finally, the trial 
court would have to analyze whether this fact affected the Fourth 
Amendment reasonable suspicion analysis. 
The requirement of objective data in Fourth Amendment hearings 
will present concerns for both prosecutors and defense lawyers.  
From the prosecution side, the requirement creates an additional 
burden of production.  While the statistics may be available to most 
police departments, they might not be as accessible to line 
prosecutors.  One can imagine that while a police captain might have 
a virtual or actual pushpin map of every crime in his jurisdiction,293 a 
prosecutor may not be privy to such information.  In addition, for the 
statistics to mean anything they will need to be current to the month 
near the alleged offense.  New channels of communication may need 
to be created to facilitate this flow of information from the police to 
the prosecutor.  In those jurisdictions that do maintain such crime 
statistics, however, it should not be too difficult to produce the 
materials to be introduced in court.294  Certainly, once courts begin 
demanding such data, prosecutors’ offices will respond.  In many 
 293. See MARKOVIC & STONE, supra note 28, at 1 (“For decades, police agencies have 
relied on wall maps to detect patterns in the locations of certain crimes, but the 
recent use of computers to map crime has greatly increased the value of mapping.”). 
 294. This mechanism could be as simple as having the police print out the 
publicly available information before coming to court. 
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jurisdictions the information exists in the public record and merely 
needs to be organized for submission to the court. 
From a defense perspective, the introduction of objective crime 
statistic data also presents some real concerns.  At a conceptual level, 
it legitimates an otherwise ambiguous and usually contestable 
argument of the government.  The otherwise vague opinions of a 
police officer now will be replaced with evidence that can be given 
constitutional weight.  This may mean that courts will be more willing 
to factor “high-crime area” considerations into their Fourth 
Amendment analysis.  Further, in lending the veneer of objectivity, it 
minimizes the racial- and class-based assumptions that may be built 
into “reasonable suspicion” determinations.295  Also, with the police 
department controlling the collection and dissemination of statistics 
and data, there is a concern with police officials’ ability to influence 
Fourth Amendment determinations.  There will be an incentive to 
label certain areas “high crime” to focus police resources and 
attention on those areas.  This may create a self-fulfilling situation, 
whereby police targeting of certain areas will result in more arrests 
and thus more latitude to stop even more people based on a lower 
standard of reasonable suspicion.  On the other hand, for defense 
lawyers, verifiable data will allow challenges to previously 
unchallengeable assertions of police officers in Fourth Amendment 
hearings.  It now will be possible empirically to refute assertions of 
officers and demand a more accurate assessment of neighborhood 
characteristics. 
Despite these concerns, moving toward an objective, statistics-based 
approach to high-crime areas will ultimately offer courts the 
significant advantage of clarity and a measure of intellectual honesty 
to an otherwise malleable term.  As observed in the discussion in Part 
II, reliance on inexact, subjective beliefs leads to inconsistent and 
unverifiable findings.  If Fourth Amendment protections are to be 
constitutionally altered (either explicitly or implicitly) in particular 
areas, courts should carefully consider the characteristics of those 
areas to focus the analysis on more objective metrics.  Because the 
data and collection measures now exist to determine whether 
statistics show that one area objectively has more crime than another, 
 295. See Johnson, supra note 278, at 255 (“With other factors, prejudice may be 
hidden in the police officer’s ‘expertise.’  For example, when a police officer 
describes a neighborhood as ‘high crime’ or ‘drug-prone,’ a court cannot exercise 
the judicial detachment relied upon with factors involving overt prejudice.  The 
court may completely accept the expertise, risking that the officer’s prejudice about 
ghetto neighborhoods clouds his evaluation of the probability of crime contributed 
by the neighborhood.”). 
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courts should be demanding this information on a regular basis.  
Like many contestable facts, high-crime areas will not be easily 
defined, but the debate will help improve the analysis. 
Adopting this requirement for objective and verifiable evidence 
accomplishes several constitutional and practical goals.  First, it 
strengthens the protection of individual rights by requiring the 
government to justify an infringement on liberty.  In addition, it 
grounds the objective nature of Fourth Amendment analysis in real 
data and limits the area in question to a specific and particularized 
geographical and temporal area.  It ensures that the information is 
used only in appropriate cases requiring courts to find a nexus 
between the area and the suspicions of the officer.  Finally, it provides 
an incentive to improve intelligence-based crime-solving 
technologies. 
This last point should not be forgotten.  Establishing an objective, 
data-supported standard not only strengthens constitutional 
protections, but improves local policing and community 
involvement.296  Data driven policing is a reality of modern law 
enforcement.  The requirement to collect and utilize existing 
information with existing tools can only benefit the effectiveness of 
police.  Similarly, this information should be shared with community 
stakeholders who have an interest in a safe community.297  The high-
crime area designation has many consequences, from depressing 
economic investment and home prices, to increasing public funds to 
underserved districts.  Using this information in court will simply 
sharpen the collection mechanisms and provide a better sense of the 
crime patterns of an area. 
From a constitutional perspective, the addition of some objective, 
verifiable data will benefit trial courts that are otherwise ill-equipped 
to make judgments about the character of a neighborhood.  
Eventually, the repetition of cases and areas will be such that some 
order will be placed on local jurisdictions in terms of high crime 
spots.  Judges may soon come to know the repeat problem areas, and 
also have a comparative benchmark in terms of rates of crime.  
 296. See MARKOVIC & STONE, supra note 28, at 7 (“The three most common uses of 
computerized crime mapping are to measure police performance, solve specific 
crime problems, and inform the public.  Police agencies that use maps to measure 
their own performance and hold themselves accountable are typically trying to 
monitor changes in crime over time or to compare crime levels in different 
districts.”). 
 297. See id. at 11 (examining ways in which crime statistics can be used by 
community members as well as government officials to allow for community-wide 
strategies for crime reduction and prevention). 
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Determinations such as legislatively designated hot-spots or red zones 
will simplify some judicial decisions.  However, the real definition will 
only be determined through cases, as litigants argue about the 
specific areas, patterns, and their relevance to the particular case 
before the court.
